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A RTICLES
THE “U NCA NNY VA LLEY” A ND THE
VERISIMILITU D E OF SEXU A L OFFEND ERS—
PA RT I: A N “ETHOROBOTIC” PERSPECTIVE
by: M ichael T . Flannery*
“T hose who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little
tem porary safety, deserve neither L iberty nor Safety.”
– Benjamin Franklin 1
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Benjamin Franklin’s familiar slogan presents a bit of an uncanny
paradox in that, when reflected upon itself, its opposite meaning may
present an equal truth. A s Law Professor E ugene Volokh noted, “O ne
can just as well say, ‘Those who would give up essential Safety, to
purchase a little temporary Liberty, deserve neither Liberty nor
Safety.’” 2 Professor Volokh determines that
* A ssociate D ean for A cademic A ffairs, Judge G eorge H oward, Jr. D istinguished Professor of Law, U niversity of A rkansas at Little R ock, William H . Bowen
School of Law.
1. Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania A ssem bly: R eply to the G overnor, N A T ’L
A R CH IVE S (Nov. 11, 1755), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-0602-0107 [https://perma.cc/MU 7A -A CYC].
2. E ugene Volokh, L iberty, Safety, and B enjam in Frank lin, W A SH . P O ST : T H E
V O LO KH C O NSPIR A CY (Nov. 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/11/liberty-safety-and-benjamin-franklin/?utm_term=.1f
4456e565a4 [https://perma.cc/U R 9A -B873].
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the analysis has to acknowledge that we must sometimes sacrifice
some liberty in order to protect ourselves, and thus has to focus on
the specifics of each proposal—the magnitude of the loss to liberty,
the magnitude of the gain to safety, the alternative means that
might yield a better trade-off, and so on—rather than on broad generalities about liberty and safety in the abstract.3

A nd so it is in the context of determining public policy with respect
to the civil commitment of sexual offenders.4 If asked, “May state governments infringe upon the liberty interests of an individual sexual
offender who poses a high risk of recidivism, to protect the safety of
countless innocent potential victims?,” presumably, most would respond, “O f course.” But if asked, “May state governments impose indeterminate restrictive confinement on thousands of inmates who
have completed their criminal sentences and who will pose minimal
risk to society if released from their completed incarceration?,” presumably, the response would be, “N o.” 5 Yet the questions present a
paradox of interests. A s Professor Volokh concludes, the real work in
solving this paradox lies in “the decision about what aspects of liberty
are essential, and how much safety is at stake. [Franklin’s] slogan
might work as a reminder not to make foolish tradeoffs, but the real
difficulty is in deciding which tradeoffs are wise and which are foolish.” 6 H owever, until we can accurately assess this tradeoff in the context of the civil commitment of sexual offenders, Franklin’s
admonition is “simply a truism that at most calls on us to carefully
measure how much we’re giving up and how much we’re getting in
return.” 7
To that end, consider that, as of 2019, in the context of the civil
commitment of sexual offenders, twenty states and the D istrict of Columbia have measured this tradeoff and balanced it in favor of enforc3. E ugene Volokh, L iberty vs. Security, V O LO KH C O NSPIR A CY , (June 6, 2002, 7:40
A M), http://volokh.com/2002_06_02_volokh_archive.html#85145653 [https://perma.cc/
LP36-JS6S].
4. “Civil commitment” is the state- or federally-imposed statutory construct for
involuntarily confining to a secured facility persons convicted of qualified sexual
crimes who have completed their criminal incarceration, but whom a court has determined to suffer from a qualified diagnosed mental or personality disorder that makes
the individual likely to commit future acts of sexual violence, and who poses a serious
risk of committing another sexually violent predatory crime if not treated in a secure
setting. See generally M ICH A E L T. F LA NNE R Y & R A YMO ND C. O ’B R IE N , T H E SE XU A L
E XPLO ITA TIO N O F C H ILD R E N 780–806 (2016) (discussing civil commitment). Individual federal and state statutes define the qualifying sexual crimes and mental disorders
that satisfy the respective statutes; accordingly, specific qualifications for civil commitment vary among jurisdictions. See infra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
5. “[C]oncerns about public safety cannot justify policies that impose serious burdens on entire categories of individuals when many of them actually present little
risk. . . .” Ira Mark E llman & Tara E llman, “Frightening and H igh”: T he Suprem e
Court’s Crucial M istak e about Sex Crim e Statistics, 30 C O NST . C O MME NT . 495, 506
(2015) (discussing sexual offender registry requirements for juvenile offenders).
6. Volokh, supra note 3.
7. Id.
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ing civil commitment laws against sexually violent offenders.8 A t the
federal level, the A dam Walsh Child Protection and Safety A ct of
2006 governs the civil commitment of sexually violent persons.9 A lthough all civil commitment programs ideally have the same dual purpose—to protect society from, and effectively treat, sexual offenders
who pose a significant risk of recidivism if not committed to a locked
facility—states vary quite significantly in their approaches to assessing
and treating sexual offenders so that eventually they may be released
from commitment and successfully reintegrated into the community.10
For example, Minnesota and Missouri are two states that have enforced civil commitment laws since 1994 and 1999, respectively. Combined, these two states have retained custody of over 1,500 sexual
offenders who have been civilly committed to these state programs to
receive treatment before reentering their communities. H owever,
from the time these programs began until 2015, there had not been a
single civilly committed sexual offender who had successfully completed either program and had been released to reintegrate into the
community. Consequently, civilly committed sexual offenders have
brought litigation in these and other states claiming qualification for
release and a variety of other issues.11 Such litigation has highlighted
8. These states include: A rizona, California, D istrict of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New H ampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North D akota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin. See A R IZ . R E V . STA T . §§ 36-3701 to 36-3717 (2018); C A L .
W E L . & I NST . C O D E §§ 6600–6609.3 (West 2010 & Supp. 2019); D .C. M U N . R E G S. tit
22, §§ 4001–4017 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2018); F LA . STA T . A NN .
§§ 394.910–394.932 (West 2018); 725 I LL . C O MP . STA T . A NN . §§ 207/1–207/99 (Supp.
2018); I O WA C O D E A NN . §§ 229A .1–229A .16 (West 2014); K A N . STA T . A NN . §§ 5929a01–59-29a21 (West 2017); M A SS. G E N . L AWS A NN . ch. 123A , §§ 1–16 (West 2017);
M INN . STA T . A NN . §§ 253B.001–253B.24 (West 2015); M O . A NN . STA T .
§§ 632.480–632.560 (West 2014 & Supp. 2019); N E B . R E V . STA T . A NN .
§§ 71.1201–71.1228 (West 2017); N.H . R E V . STA T . A NN . §§ 135-E :1–135-E :24 (LexisNexis 2015); N.J. STA T . A NN . §§ 30:4-27.24–30:4-27.38 (West 2008); N.Y. M E NTA L
H YG . L AW §§ 10.01–10.017 (McKinney 2013 & Supp. 2018); N.D . C E NT . A NN . §§ 2503.3-01–25-03.3-24 (West Supp. 2017); 42 P A . STA T . A ND C O NS. STA T . A NN .
§§ 6401–6409 (West 2013); S.C. C O D E A NN . §§ 44-48-10–44-48-170 (2017); T E X .
H E A LTH & SA FE TY C O D E A NN . §§ 841.001–841.007 (West 2017); V A . C O D E A NN .
§§ 37.2-900–37.2-921 (2014 & Supp. 2018); W A SH . R E V . C O D E A NN .
§§ 71.09.010–71.09.9903 (West 2014 & Supp. 2019); W IS. STA T . A NN . §§ 980.01–980.14
(West 2007 & Supp. 2018).
9. A dam Walsh Child Protection and Safety A ct of 2006, Pub L. No.109-248, 120
Stat. 587 (2006).
10. In K ansas v. H endrick s, the U nited States Supreme Court characterized the
confinement of sexual offenders as civil, not criminal, in nature. Kansas v. H endricks,
521 U .S. 346, 369 (1997). B ut see A rielle W. Tolman, Sex O ffender Civil Com m itm ent
to Prison Post-Kingsley, 113 N.W. U . L. R E V . 155 (2018) (arguing that the U nited
States Supreme Court’s holding in K ingsley v. H endrick son, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015),
supports a determination that confinement in civil commitment may be deemed punitive in nature based upon the conditions of confinement).
11. See, e.g., U nited States v. Welsh, 879 F.3d 530, 538 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding
federal civil commitment order still valid despite vacation of underlying federal conviction); U nited States v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513, 515 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding, after
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the ineffectiveness of the programs and the questionable constitutionality of the procedures used to assess, treat, and reintegrate sexual
offenders.
Based on this litigation, for civil commitment strategies to be applied constitutionally, state programs must be effective in treating
civilly committed sexual offenders so that the offenders eventually
may be released from their commitment and reintegrated safely into
the community. To do this, every state must address the flaws in the
procedures used for committing, treating, assessing, and releasing
civilly committed sexual offenders. This may include: (1) reevaluating
the process and criteria by which the state recommends civil commitment for prisoners who have completed their criminal sentences for
committing sexual crimes; (2) providing civilly committed sexual offenders with timely and effective treatment designed to actually treat
the individual offender and prepare the offender for release and reintegration into the community and not just to remove the offender
from the community indefinitely; (3) providing services to sexual offenders who are released from civil commitment so they may have an
opportunity to locate housing, become employed, and participate in
continued treatment; and (4) adequately addressing not only the
safety of the communities into which sexual offenders are released but
also addressing the public’s perception of sexual offenders and their
risk of recidivating upon reintegration into the community.
Currently, this is not happening. Nor is this lik ely to happen—even
for sexual offenders who are evaluated with the most modern assessment techniques, who successfully complete treatment, and who are
released from civil commitment with a low risk of recidivism and the
maximum constitutionally allowable restrictions on their freedom.
E ven then, the public will be resistant to, and will categorically oppose, the reintegration of sexual offenders into the community. It
would appear that society is truly invested in civilly committing sexual
offenders so that they can receive the treatment they need to be reremand from Supreme Court, civil commitment evidentiary standard constitutional in
light of prior decisions distinguishing civil and criminal proceedings); Brown v. Watters, 599 F.3d 602, 603 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming denial of writ of habeas corpus by
civilly committed sexually violent predator (“SVP”) based on diagnosis); McG ee v.
Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 581 (7th Cir. 2010) (dismissing habeas corpus petition by civil
committee claiming diagnosis violated constitutional rights); Willis v. Palmer, No.
C12-4086-MWB, 2018 WL 3966959, at *24 (N.D . Iowa 2018) (dismissing civil rights
lawsuit challenging constitutionality of continued civil commitment in light of K arsjens decision); Ireland v. A nderson, No. 3:13-CV-03, 2017 WL 1089333, at *2
(D .N.D . 2017) (finding state civil commitment scheme “unconstitutional on its face
because it does not require that the defendants initiate court proceedings for release
of individuals who no longer meet SD I criteria.”); California v. Superior Court of
L.A . Cty., 238 Cal. R ptr. 3d 14, 40 (Cal. Ct. A pp. 2018) (finding seventeen-year delay
for civil commitment trial violated right to speedy trial); see also Pennsylvania v. Butler, 173 A .3d 1212, 1213 (Pa. Super. 2017) (finding unconstitutional state statutory
scheme providing for clear and convincing evidence to justify enhanced sentence as
SVP because of criminal nature of punishment).
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leased safely into the community without committing future sexual
crimes. Nearly half of the states invest millions of dollars every year to
construct facilities to house such offenders and to provide treatment
and services for this to occur.12 H owever, in reality, instead of being
treated and released, sexual offenders are being detained indefinitely
in locked facilities, often with no hope or possibility of release. This
A rticle explores the possibility that the system may be designed this
way because of society’s universalized perception of sexual offenders—even those who successfully complete treatment—as incurable,
recidivistic monsters.13
This A rticle is the first in a series of three articles in which I explain
the cycle of misperception of sexual offenders that has encouraged the
unconstitutional application of sexual offender laws, including civil
commitment laws, in a false effort to quell public fear, protect children, and reduce sexual victimization. In this first A rticle of the series,
I propose that this cycle of misperception and the resistance to the
release of civilly committed sexual offenders may be, in part, the product of a novel phenomenon known as the “uncanny valley” effect.
In 1970, the Japanese roboticist, Masahito Mori, hypothesized that
the “uncanny valley” identifies a paradoxical phenomenon that occurs
to one’s affinity for nonhuman stimuli representing progressively
human-like qualities.14 This hypothesis predicts that people generally
will have favorable reactions to the progressive development of
human-like characteristics in artificial stimuli, such as dolls and robots,
but will be left unsettled by the fully developed but not fully human
likeness that ultimately results. Thus, a subject’s affinity for a robot
increases as the robot becomes more human-like. H owever, there
12. Sex O ffender Confinem ent Costing States T oo M uch, CBS N E WS (June 22,
2010), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sex-offender-confinement-costing-states-toomuch/ [https://perma.cc/8VFP-P68B] (describing quandary for lawmakers who must
cut costs but do not want to appear soft on sexual offenders).
13. See generally John D ouard, Sex O ffender as Scapegoat: T he M onstrous O ther
W ithin, 53 N.Y.L. SCH . L. R E V . 31, 32 (2008–09) (arguing that psychologists and psychiatrists create frameworks that categorize sexual offenders as undeserving of certain
legal and moral rights).
14. Mori’s original essay was first published in Japanese. See Masahito Mori,
B uk im i N o T ani (T he Uncanny V alley), 7 E NE R G Y 33 (1970). The first authorized
E nglish translation of Mori’s essay was published in 2012. See Masahiro Mori, T he
Uncanny V alley, 19 IE E E R O BO TICS & A U TO MA TIO N M A G . 98, 98–99 (trans., Karl F.
MacD orman & Norri Kageki June 2012) (1970), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
30b2/56f24fee21029c5e63d396b9e737f21f7764.pdf?_ga=2.152970042.242619994.15493
12809-1619334946.1549312809 [https://perma.cc/J2A H -BR MA ] [hereinafter Mori
Translation]. Mori’s theory focused on industrial robots and other mechanical devices
as subject stimuli, although other technological innovations, such as prosthetic limbs
and anthropomorphic robots, were already developing. A s a theoretical hypothesis,
the concept became more contemporarily topical with the advancement of computeranimation technology. Jari K ätsyri et al., A R eview of E m pirical E vidence on D ifferent
Uncanny V alley H ypotheses: Support for Perceptual M ism atch as O ne R oad to the
V alley of E eriness, F R O NTIE R S P SYCH O L . 1–2 (A pr. 10, 2015), https://www.frontiers
in.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00390/pdf [https://perma.cc/V8NF-65XK].
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comes a point at which the nonhuman robot appears so human-like
that the subject is unable to distinguish it from a real human, and it is
at this point that the subject’s affinity for the robot reverts sharply to
the negative. In this nonlinear relationship between the human likeness of the stimuli and one’s affinity for it, the uncanny valley represents the area of transition from positive to negative, which occurs at
the point of essential indistinguishability between the fully developed
nonhuman stimuli and the fully healthy human.
D espite the novel contextual application of Mori’s theory that I
propose here, this first A rticle of this series analogizes the uncanny
valley hypothesis within the context of sexual offenders, specifically
with respect to the public’s perception of sexual offenders as “inhuman” monsters. It is my hope that this hypothesis can be tested empirically. A t the conclusion of this three-article series, I propose that if, in
fact, the uncanny valley exists in this context,15 it may be possible for
sexual offenders to bridge the uncanny valley and reintegrate successfully into the community, provided there exists a constitutional framework of civil commitment treatment programs that are designed
toward this end and are effective. In this first A rticle, however, I
merely conclude that, based on the analogous application of the uncanny valley hypothesis within the context of sexual offenders, it appears that the uncanny valley does exist in this context. I conclude,
however, that in this context, Mori’s original uncanny valley hypothesis, as applied to robotics, must be extended—by applying an ethological perspective 16—to accurately reflect the public’s perception of
15. Current studies of the uncanny valley hypothesis are equivocal as to the existence of the uncanny valley in various contexts. See Shensheng Wang et al., T he Uncanny V alley: E xistence and E xplanations, 19 R E V . G E N . P SYCH O L . 393, 393, 403
(2015) (concluding that “existing evidence neither completely refutes nor corroborates the uncanny valley hypothesis. Whether the uncanny valley exists is still an
open question. . . . [I]t is unclear whether the uncanny valley is a real phenomenon or
merely a plausible conjecture.”). I recommend in the third article of this series that
social scientists should undertake to study the studies of the uncanny valley effect and
design appropriate studies to test the existence of the uncanny valley within the context of the public perception of sexual offenders. See Michael T. Flannery, T he Uncanny V alley and the V erisim ilitude of Sexual O ffenders— Part III: B ridging the
Uncanny V alley (forthcoming 2020).
16. Broadly speaking, ethology concerns the evolutionary and genetic significance
of a species’ adaptive behavior within its natural habitat as a function of survival.
A lthough original ethological theory focused on biological evolution relevant to adaptive behavior, narrower concepts of ethological theory have branched into other disciplines, like behavioral psychology, sociobiology, and human behaviorism. See
generally I R E NA U S E IBL -E IBE SFE LD T , H U MA N E TH O LO G Y (2007) (presenting what is
viewed as the first unified overview of ethological theory). Within the context of
robotics and human–robot interaction, Mori’s hypothesis of the uncanny valley focuses on physicality and human likeness as a function of successful integration of the
robot within the “natural habitat” of the human being. Mori concludes that this approach results in the uncanny valley, which can only be avoided by limiting the physicality or human likeness of the robot, thereby minimizing its potential to fully
integrate. Instead, an ethological approach focuses on the organism’s functionality,
rather than its physicality and human likeness, as a measure of successful integration.
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sexual offenders and to provide for any realistic hope of sexual offenders bridging the uncanny valley.
Before applying the uncanny valley hypothesis to the context of
sexual offenders, we must first recognize and accept the limitations of
the theory’s application. Mori’s premise is based in science, and its
primary application has been limited to scientific inquiry—specifically
in the areas of computer graphics, robotics (especially human–robot
interactions), and virtual reality. Mori’s theory has been tested using
empirical research and calculable data. H owever, this A rticle posits no
empirical data relevant to the application of Mori’s theory. Nor is it
the purpose of this A rticle to prove the application of Mori’s theory to
sexual offenders or in any way, most certainly, to categorize sexual
offenders as some comparable form of robot or as existentially inferior to human beings.17 R ather, the purpose of this A rticle is merely to
present a hypothesis about Mori’s hypothesis of the uncanny valley
based on observed parallelisms, which I will describe infra. In fact,
without such empirical data to support the proof of any scientific application of the theory, the only conclusion I draw here is that there
are sufficient parallels for social scientists to study, empirically, the
possible effect of the uncanny valley on the public’s perception—and
the legal treatment—of sexual offenders. I merely assert that Mori’s
hypothesis of the uncanny valley, in the context of sexual offenders,
presents as relevant and applicable in many poignant ways that are
worth studying. I leave it to the social scientists to design relevant formats and reliable methods for testing the application of this hypothesis in this context. A ssuming Mori’s theory of the uncanny valley is
relevant and applicable to the context of sexual offenders, I propose
in this series of articles how the law might consider this effect and
constitutionally respond to it so that qualified, low-risk sexual offenders can bridge the uncanny valley and successfully reintegrate into the
community in a way that the public not only perceives as safe and
acceptable but, in reality, more effectively reduces recidivism, protects
children, and minimizes or eliminates sexual victimization.
In this series of three articles, I will present the relevant context
within which I propose the uncanny valley effect exists—the civil commitment of sexual offenders. For purposes of these articles, this process includes everything from the perpetration of a sexual offense to
In Part II, I will describe how the ethological approach is applied to the context of
robots (an “ethorobotic” approach). Then, in Part III, I will analogize an ethorobotic
extension of Mori’s hypothesis to the context of sexual offenders. I propose that in the
context of integrating sexual offenders into the natural habitat or society of fully
healthy human beings, an ethological approach maximizes the potential for successful
integration by avoiding the uncanny valley.
17. B ut see Judith Levine & E rica R . Meiners, A re Sex O ffenders H um an?, B A FFLE R (Nov. 15, 2016), https://thebaffler.com/latest/sex-offenders-human-levine-mein
ers [https://perma.cc/9947-R Z H 5] (criticizing media outlets that dehumanize sexual
offenders).
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incarceration, assessment, post-incarceration civil commitment, treatment, conditional release, and ultimately unconditional reintegration
into the community. Successful reintegration is dependent upon the
constitutionality of federal and state legislative responses that attempt
to reconcile the dilemma of what to do with sexual offenders upon
release. Legislative responses vary—from registration and public notification requirements18 to housing and employment restrictions,19 satellite-based G lobal Positioning System (“G PS”) monitoring,20 social
media restrictions,21 polygraph testing,22 anti-libidinal interventions,
18. Sexual offender registration requirements exist at the federal and state level.
For relevant federal laws, see the Jacob Wetterling Crimes A gainst Children and Sexually Violent O ffender R egistration A ct, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XVII, subtit. A ,
§ 170101, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U .S.C. § 14071 (2006))
(requiring all states to implement registration and community notification laws (also
known as “Megan’s Law”)); A dam Walsh Child Protection and Safety A ct, Pub. L.
No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 590 (codified at 42 U .S.C. §§ 16913 (mandating registration),
16918(a) (mandating community notification) (2006)) (also known as the Sex O ffender R egistration and Notification A ct (“SO R NA ”)). For a chart showing state
compliance with SO R NA requirements, see O FFICE O F SE X O FFE ND E R SE NTE NCING ,
M O NITO R ING , A PPR E H E ND ING , R E G ISTE R ING , & T R A CKING , SE X O FFE ND E R R E G ISTR A TIO N A ND N O TIFICA TIO N A CT (SO R NA ) STA TE A ND T E R R ITO R Y I MPLE ME NTA TIO N P R O G R E SS C H E CK (D ec. 17, 2018), available at https://www.smart.gov/pdfs/
SO R NA -progress-check.pdf.
19. Some states employ residency and employment restrictions that prohibit sexual offenders from maintaining a residence or employment within certain distances
from locations where children are likely to congregate, such as schools and daycare
facilities. See, e.g., A LA . C O D E §§ 15-20A -11 (regarding prohibited residence locations), -13 (regarding employment restrictions) (2017). Municipalities also may enforce local residency restrictions. See R yals v. City of E nglewood, 364 P.3d 900, 909
(finding that Colorado law did not preempt city ordinance banning sex offenders from
residing within its borders).
20. See, e.g., D E L . C O D E A NN . tit. 11, § 4121(u) (2019) (“[A ]ny Tier III sex offender being monitored at Level IV, III, II or I, shall as a condition of their probation,
wear a G PS locator ankle bracelet paid for by the probationer.”).
21. See, e.g., L A . STA T . A NN . § 15:542.1(D )(1) (2018) (“A ny person who is required to register pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter, who is otherwise not
prohibited from using a networking website, and who creates a profile or who uses the
functionality of a networking website to contact or attempt to contact other networking website users shall include in his profile for the networking website an indication
that he is a sex offender or child predator and shall include notice of the crime for
which he was convicted, the jurisdiction of conviction, a description of his physical
characteristics as required by this Section, and his residential address. The person
shall ensure that this information is displayed in his profile for the networking website
and that such information is visible to, or is able to be viewed by, other users and
visitors of the networking website.”). B ut see Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.
Ct. 1730 (2017) (finding North Carolina statute prohibiting sex offenders from accessing social networking websites violated First A mendment).
22. See, e.g., F LA . STA T . A NN . § 948.30(2) (West 2018) (“E ffective for a probationer or community controllee whose crime was committed on or after O ctober 1,
1997, and who is placed on community control or sex offender probation . . . , the
court must impose the following conditions of probation or community control: (a) A s
part of a treatment program, participation at least annually in polygraph examinations
to obtain information necessary for risk management and treatment and to reduce the
sex offender’s denial mechanisms.”).
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including various methods of castration,23 and the imposition of civil
commitment of an indeterminate duration.24 E ach individual response
may warrant constitutional assessment. For example, the U nited
States Supreme Court has ruled more than once on various aspects of
sexual offender registration and notification laws25 and is postured to
render a decision reconsidering the constitutionality of the federal Sex
O ffender R egistration and Notification A ct (“SO R NA ”), for which it
heard oral arguments in its O ctober 2018 term, in G rundy v. United
States.26 A lthough these decisions are limited to their specific holdings
on specific responses, the reasoning supporting these decisions may
have a direct impact on the constitutionality of the reintegration management policies associated with civil commitment laws.
In Part I of this first of three articles, I will describe the twenty-one
jurisdictions that have enacted, and currently enforce, civil commitment laws against sexually violent offenders, which has culminated in
litigation in multiple jurisdictions. The litigation in Minnesota 27 and
Missouri,28 specifically, postured the issue of the constitutionality of
such laws on the doorstep of the U nited States Supreme Court in
2017, but the Court declined to resolve the issue.29 In this A rticle, I
will discuss the effect of the Court’s refusal to resolve the constitutional issue for those states that are affected by the outcome. I assert
that this outcome is the product of the uncanny valley phenomenon.
In Part II of this first A rticle, I will briefly describe the concept of
“the uncanny” so that we may understand its relevance to the application of Mori’s hypothesis. I will present the diagram Mori used to conceptualize his hypothesis in the contexts of robotics design and
human–robot interactions, and I will discuss the few studies that have
23. See, e.g., C A L . P E NA L C O D E § 645(b) (West 2019) (“A ny person guilty of a
second conviction of any offense specified in subdivision (c), where the victim has not
attained 13 years of age, shall, upon parole, undergo medroxyprogesterone acetate
treatment or its chemical equivalent . . . .”).
24. For the states that impose civil commitment on sexual offenders, see supra
note 8.
25. See, e.g., U nited States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U .S. 387, 399, (2013) (holding that
the Sex O ffender R egistration and Notification A ct (“SO R NA ”) may properly apply
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to sexual offenders who already completed
their sentences prior to SO R NA ’s enactment); Smith v. D oe, 538 U .S. 84, 105–106,
(2003) (holding that A laska’s Sex O ffender R egistration A ct does not violate the ex
post facto clause of the U nited States Constitution); see also Packingham v. North
Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (holding that North Carolina’s statute prohibiting sexual offenders from accessing social networking websites violated the First
A mendment).
26. U nited States v. G rundy, 695 F. A pp’x 639 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S.
Ct. 1260 (2018).
27. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (D . Minn.), rev’d sub nom . Karsjens v.
Piper, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 106–07 (2017).
28. See Van O rden v. Schafer, 129 F. Supp. 3d 839 (E .D . Mo. 2015), vacated in part
on reconsideration sub nom ., Van O rden v. Stringer, 262 F. Supp. 3d 887 (E .D . Mo.
2017), appeal filed, No. 17-3093 (8th Cir. Sept. 27, 2017).
29. Karsjens v. Piper, 138 S. Ct. 106–07 (2017).
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identified the uncanny valley in contexts other than robotics. Based on
these studies, in Part II, I will discuss the natural limitations of Mori’s
hypothesis, and I will demonstrate how the extension of Mori’s hypothesis, from an “ethorobotic” perspective, addresses any such limitations in the context of sexual offenders and serves to reconcile the
constitutional dilemma surrounding sexual offenders that I discuss in
Part I.
In Part III of this A rticle, I will support the viability of the application of Mori’s uncanny valley hypothesis to the context of sexual offenders. I propose that Mori’s hypothesis precisely parallels the
public’s perception of sexual offenders and its simultaneous demand
for, but intolerance of, successful sexual offender treatment programs
that ultimately provide for the release and reintegration of sexually
violent offenders into the community. The purpose of this series, however, is not simply to demonstrate the parallelism of the uncanny valley. R ather, its purpose is to identify the point at which the uncanny
valley manifests in the public’s perception of treated sexual offenders
and, if the uncanny valley is to be avoided, how we might constitutionally bridge the uncanny valley for those offenders who pose minimal
or no risk of recidivism so as to safely and effectively reintegrate qualified sexual offenders into the community. I conclude in this first A rticle that if sexual offenders are to be reintegrated safely and
successfully into the community after civil commitment, we must begin to account for the uncanny valley effect as a variable in the equation. More specifically, I conclude that an expanded conceptualization
of Mori’s uncanny valley hypothesis, as applied within the narrower
context of “ethorobotics,” is an appropriate perspective with which to
apply the uncanny valley hypothesis within the context of sexual offenders. This first A rticle, therefore, lays the foundation for the second and third articles of the trilogy.
A ccepting the analogy of an “ethorobotic” application of the uncanny valley hypothesis within the context of sexual offenders, the
second article in this series—T he Uncanny V alley and the V erisim ilitude of Sexual O ffenders— Part II: Perception V ersus R eality 30—will
address the verisimilitude of sexual offenders by exploring the various
public and professional perceptions of sexual offenders that perpetuate the cycle of false reality that results. These include the perceptions
adopted by sexual offenders themselves, as well as the perceptions
adopted by the families and victims of sexual offenders, and the public, generally. It also includes the perceptions of therapists and counselors, nurses, sexual offender treatment program support staff, law
enforcement, parole personnel, judges, and a variety of other professional influences that play a role in the lives of sexual offenders. Based
30. Michael T. Flannery, T he Uncanny V alley and the V erisim ilitude of Sexual O ffenders— Part II: Perception V ersus R eality (forthcoming 2020).
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on the perceptions and attitudes of all of these constituents, in the
second article in this series, I will discuss the distinction between perception and reality vis-à-vis the nature of sexual offenders, their risk
of recidivism, the effectiveness of sexual offender treatment programs,
and the propriety and ultimate constitutionality of sexual offender reintegration management policies. I also will discuss the critical role the
media plays in creating and facilitating the cycle of public and professional misperceptions that promotes public fear, demands legislative
response, and ultimately undermines the very purpose of sexual offender management policies31—to protect children and to reduce recidivism and sexual victimization. Specifically, in the second article, I
will discuss the systematic failures of the mental health and legal professions to accurately assess the recidivism risk of sexual offenders
and these professions’ reliance on this inaccurate assessment to justify
the failure of the systems. This historic and colossal blunder has resulted in the very incommensurable dilemma that the Court is now
called upon to remedy, which may result in either the unrestricted release of thousands of sexual offenders into the community, or the continued unconstitutional commitment of thousands of persons who
served their criminal sentences for their crimes and successfully completed state-mandated treatment programs but whom a misinformed
society simply refuses to tolerate within the community.
A ccepting the premise of the uncanny valley hypothesis as
presented in this first A rticle, and the verisimilitude of sexual offenders, as presented in the second article, I present in the third article—
T he Uncanny V alley and the V erisim ilitude of Sexual O ffenders— Part
III: B ridging the Uncanny V alley 32—the possibility of sexual offenders
bridging the uncanny valley and successfully reintegrating into society.
Social science research on the nature of sexual offenders and the
alignment of accurate assessment tools, individualized treatment
plans, and effective sexual offender management policies, supports
the view that sexual offender reintegration can be successful and constitutionally applied. A ccomplishing this, however, requires grappling
with the distinction between the perceptions and realities of sexual
offenders and educating the public on these distinctions. In the third
article, I demonstrate that the media and the law are very slowly—and
sometimes reluctantly—beginning to more clearly perceive the truth
about the nature of sexual offenders and the cyclical effect of the uncanny valley phenomenon. I consider in the third article whether, with
this truth, it is possible for sexual offenders to bridge the uncanny val31. The sexual offender management policies I address in the second article include: (1) registration; (2) notification; (3) residency restrictions; (4) G PS monitoring;
(5) social media restrictions; (6) polygraph testing; and (7) anti-libidinal interventions
and various methods of castration. Id.
32. Michael T. Flannery, T he Uncanny V alley and the V erisim ilitude of Sexual O ffenders— Part III: B ridging the Uncanny V alley (forthcoming 2020).
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ley and successfully reintegrate into society. To accomplish this, we
must not only continue to study the effect of the uncanny valley
through more advanced scientific research in robotics and
human–robot interaction, but we must “study” the studies of the uncanny valley hypothesis itself, including its application in various other
contexts, to be able to design appropriate empirical research that is
relevant, reliable, and predictive as applied to sexual offenders. The
realization of this possibility depends on the public’s and various professionals’ willingness not only to see and accept the truth about sexual offenders but to embrace the uncanny “truthlikeness” of our
perceptions of them. I assert in the third article that for society to
embrace its perception of sexual offenders and successfully receive
sexual offenders into the community, it must be an ethologically integrative perspective with which they are received.
This first of the series of three articles supports the conclusion that
the uncanny valley exists, that it is applicable to the context of sexual
offenders, and that, with more relevant research focused on the application of the hypothesis from an ethorobotic perspective, Mori’s uncanny valley hypothesis may inform our view of sexual offenders and
define the constitutional parameters within which society may receive
them. To begin, I will describe the context within which I assert that
this extended analogy applies—the civil commitment of sexual
offenders.
II.

T H E C IVIL C O MMITME NT

OF

SE XU A L O FFE ND E R S

The civil commitment laws that govern sexually violent offenders
are relatively new in the U nited States. Before the earliest part of the
nineteenth century, persons with mental illness were warehoused in
prisons and shelters, not to receive treatment for their illness but
merely to protect the public.33 By 1824, the first privately funded asylums were established in the northeastern U nited States, and public
institutions arose in the south shortly thereafter.34 By the end of the
nineteenth century, state-run asylums had developed across the country, mostly housing those deemed “incurable” and unfit to live in society.35 By the mid-twentieth century, asylums in the U nited States
became bloated with over 550,000 mentally ill persons, thereby providing minimal effective treatment.36 Inevitably, several factors led to
an era of deinstitutionalization: (1) The 1950s and 1960s saw a shift
toward a focus on patient liberties, including the right to trial, stricter
commitment standards, and more judicial decision-making; (2) The
creation of federal programs like Medicare and Medicaid prompted
33. Megan Testa & Sara G . West, Civil Com m itm ent in the United States, 7 P SYCH I30, 32 (2010) (providing a history of psychiatric hospitalization).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.

A TR Y
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reconsideration of the cost of institutionalizing the mentally ill; (3) Improvements in antipsychotic medications allowed for outpatient treatment; and (4) The Community Mental H ealth Centers A ct of 1963
facilitated the transitioning of patients from the ineffective inpatient
care of psychiatric hospitals to outpatient care in the community.37 A ll
of these factors prompted widespread closure of state hospitals, and
by the 1990s, the inpatient psychiatric population had decreased to
approximately 30,000 persons.38
A long with deinstitutionalization came a shift in the legal standard
for involuntary commitment from a recommendation for treatment to
consideration of imminent dangerousness caused by mental illness.39
A s states began to adopt this new standard, the U nited States Supreme Court refined the substantive and procedural parameters of its
application. For example, in O ’Connor v. D onaldson, decided in 1975,
the Court held that patients with a mental disorder manifesting known
risk could not be confined in an institution against their will “without
more,” meaning “without treatment.” 40 Four years later, in A ddington
v. T exas, the Court required a heightened standard of proof—clear
and convincing evidence—for initial involuntary commitment.41
A s the courts continued to define the substantive and procedural
standards of commitment, sexual offenders were subject to the mental
health standards that applied, but sexual offenses were not specifically
targeted. H owever, in 1989, two known sexual offenders who were on
release from civil commitment perpetrated two high-profile, violent
crimes in Seattle and Tacoma, Washington.42 Thereafter, fearful citizens expressed concern about the laws and procedures relevant to sexual offenders who completed their criminal sentences and were
postured for release from prison. In response, Washington passed the
Community Protection A ct of 1990, which was the first of the existing
civil commitment laws enacted in the U nited States specifically targeting sexually violent predators.43 A s discussed infra, nineteen other
states followed Washington’s lead by adopting similar statutes.44
37. Id. at 32–33.
38. Id. at 33.
39. Id.
40. O ’Connor v. D onaldson, 422 U .S. 563, 575 (1975) (“Mere public intolerance or
animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person’s physical
liberty.”).
41. A ddington v. Texas, 441 U .S. 418, 424–33 (1979) (hospitalizing mentally ill appellant for protection of self and others).
42. See Barry Siegel, L ock ing Up ‘Sexual Predators’: A Public O utcry in W ashington State T argeted R epeat V iolent Sex Crim inals. A N ew Preventive L aw W ould K eep
T hem in Jail Indefinitely, L.A . T IME S (May 10, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/199005-10/news/mn-1433_1_sexual-predator [https://perma.cc/V4A D -A E YQ ] (discussing
cases of G ene R aymond Kane, who killed D iane Ballasiotes on Sept. 26, 1988, and
E arl. K. Shriner, who abducted seven-year-old R yan A lan H ade, sexually assaulted
him, severed his penis, and left him to die).
43. See Community Protection A ct, ch. 3, 1990 Wash Sess. Law 12.
44. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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It was not long before persons who were involuntarily committed as
sexually violent predators challenged the constitutionality of these
statutory schemes. In 1997, in K ansas v. H endrick s, the U nited States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of state civil commitment
laws, finding that, provided appropriate due process elements are satisfied, such laws do not violate the Constitution’s double jeopardy or
ex post facto clauses.45 Since then, as of 2019, there are twenty states,
plus the D istrict of Columbia, that enforce civil commitment laws
against sexually violent predators.46 There is also federal legislation
governing the civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons.47
The constitutionality of civil commitment laws, specifically with respect to permissibility and the punitive nature of sanctions, has been
raised in several federal and state courts, which consistently have upheld the constitutionality of the laws.48 H owever, in more specific contexts collaterally related to civil commitment, such as laws related to
45. Kansas v. H endricks, 521 U .S. 346, 369 (1997).
46. These include: A rizona, California, D istrict of Columbia, Florida, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New H ampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North D akota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin. See A R IZ . R E V . STA T . §§ 36-3701–36-3717 (2018); C A L .
W E L . & I NST . C O D E §§ 6600–6609.3 (West 2010 & Supp. 2019); D .C. M U N . R E G S. tit
22, §§ 4001–4017 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2018); F LA . STA T . A NN .
§§ 394.910–394.932 (West 2018); 725 I LL . C O MP . STA T . A NN . §§ 207/1–207/99 (Supp.
2018); I O WA C O D E A NN . §§ 229A .1–229A .16 (West 2014); K A N . STA T . A NN . §§ 5929a01–59-29a21 (West 2017); M A SS. G E N . L AWS A NN . ch. 123A , §§ 1–16 (West 2017);
M INN . STA T . A NN . §§ 253B.001–253B.24 (West 2015); M O . A NN . STA T .
§§ 632.480–632.560 (West 2014 & Supp. 2019); N E B . R E V . STA T . A NN .
§§ 71.1201–71.1228 (West 2017); N.H . R E V . STA T . A NN . §§ 135-E :1–135-E :24 (LexisNexis 2015); N.J. STA T . A NN . §§ 30:4-27.24–30:4-27.38 (West 2008); N.Y. M E NTA L
H YG . L AW §§ 10.01–10.017 (McKinney 2013 & Supp. 2018); N.D . C E NT . A NN . §§ 2503.3-01–25-03.3-24 (West Supp. 2017); 42 P A . STA T . A ND C O NS. STA T . A NN .
§§ 6401–6409 (West 2013); S.C. C O D E A NN . §§ 44-48-10–44-48-170 (2017); T E X .
H E A LTH & SA FE TY C O D E A NN . §§ 841.001–841.007 (West 2017); V A . C O D E A NN .
§§ 37.2-900–37.2-921 (2014 & Supp. 2018); W A SH . R E V . C O D E A NN .
§§ 71.09.010–71.09.9903 (West 2014 & Supp. 2019); W IS. STA T . A NN . §§ 980.01–980.14
(West 2007 & Supp. 2018).
47. The A dam Walsh Child Protection and Safety A ct of 2006 governs civil commitment of sexually violent persons at the federal level. See A dam Walsh Child Protection and Safety A ct of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).
48. See, e.g., U nited States v. Comstock, 560 U .S. 126, 149 (2010) (upholding constitutionality of federal civil commitment statute under Necessary and Proper Clause);
Conn. D ep’t Pub. Safety v. D oe, 538 U .S. 1, 7–8 (2003) (upholding public notification
provisions of Connecticut’s sex offender registration law); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U .S.
407 (2002) (holding more burdensome standard for state to prove defendant had no
control over behavior to be civilly committed was too great); Seling v. Young, 531
U .S. 250, 263 (2001) (holding civil nature of Washington statute precluded inmate’s
double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges based on conditions of confinement);
Kansas v. H endricks, 521 U .S. 346, 370–71 (1997) (holding involuntary confinement
under Kansas’s Sexually Violent Predator A ct was not punitive, thereby precluding
double jeopardy or ex post facto violation); see also Charles L. Scott & Joan B.
G erbasi, Sex O ffender R egistration and Com m unity N otification Challenges: T he Suprem e Court Continues Its T rend, 31 J. A M . A CA D . P SYCH IA TR Y L. 494 (2003) (discussing constitutional challenges to Megan’s Law statutes in Connecticut and A laska).
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effective treatment for sexual offenders and sexual offender registration and community notification, courts have reached varying conclusions.49 Indicative of the ongoing debate regarding the duration of
civil commitment, and the effectiveness of treatment and release programs, are the civil commitment laws in Minnesota and Missouri. A rguably, laws in these states have functioned unconstitutionally for
many years, particularly in comparison to laws in some states, like
Wisconsin and New York, which have a much higher rate of release
from civil commitment.
A . M innesota and M issouri
In 2011, patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
O ffender Program (“MSO P”) filed a class action claim—in K arsjens v.
Jesson—challenging the constitutionality of Minnesota’s sexual offender civil commitment scheme.50 The committed offenders argued
that the scheme violated their due process rights, both facially and as
applied. Specifically, they claimed that the commitment law was not
narrowly tailored because it: (1) required no periodic risk assessment;51 (2) included no judicial review;52 (3) employed discharge criteria that were more onerous than the criteria used for admission;53 (4)
49. Com pare Conn. D ep’t of Pub. Safety v. D oe, 538 U .S. 1, 7–8 (2003) (upholding
Connecticut registration and notification law that posted pictures without showing of
risk level was not punitive and did not violate Fourteenth A mendment), Smith v.
D oe, 538 U .S. 84, 105–06 (2003) (retroactive application of registration law did not
violate ex post facto Clause because law had regulatory public safety purpose), and
McKune v. Lile, 536 U .S. 24, 29 (2002) (upholding constitutionality of tenets of treatment program requiring sex offender to admit guilt as not violating Fifth A mendment
privilege against self-incrimination because it served a “vital penological purpose”)
with Carr v. U nited States, 560 U .S. 438, 458 (2010) (holding that SO R NA ’s imposition of criminal liability for failure to register did not apply to sexual offenders who
traveled interstate before SO R NA became effective), Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U .S.
407, 446–47 (2008) (holding that death penalty for aggravated sexual crime conviction
violated E ighth A mendment), and Stogner v. California, 539 U .S. 607, 632–33 (2003)
(finding that retroactive prosecution for sexual crime when statute of limitations had
run was unconstitutional).
50. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (D . Minn. 2015), rev’d sub nom . Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 106 (2017). U nder the
MSO P, first-time offenders may obtain conditional release for ten years, while multioffenders are subject to lifetime conditional release. Id. at 1148. Conditions of release
may include: successful completion of treatment and aftercare programs, random
drug testing, house arrest, daily curfews, electronic surveillance, and participation in
an appropriate sexual offender program. Id.
51. Id. at 1150, 1159. A lthough the majority of state civil commitment programs
require periodic risk assessment of committed offenders, the MSO P had no such requirement. Id. at 1159. The court described the MSO P program as a “ ‘chutes-andladders’-type mechanism for impeding progression, without periodic review of progress, which has the effect of confinement to the MSO P facilities for life.” Id. at
1172–73.
52. Id. at 1168.
53. Id. at 1162, 1169.
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shifted the burden of proof to the committed offender;54 (5) provided
no less restrictive alternatives, despite their availability;55 and (6)
failed to require the state to petition for release or reduction in commitment on behalf of qualified offenders.56
A t the time of the court’s decision—June 2015—the detention facilities in Moose Lake and St. Peter, Minnesota, had detained more than
714 sexual offenders since the inception of the program in 1994, with
projections of 1,215 detainees by the year 2022.57 The state represented the program as “an approximately thirty-two-month program
for ‘model patients.’” 58 H owever, as of 2015, not one of the 714 persons committed to the program since 1994 had ever been fully discharged.59 In fact, Minnesota retains the highest per capita population
of civilly committed sexual offenders in the country.60 The court observed that, “in light of the structure of the MSO P and the history of
its operation, no one has any realistic hope of ever getting out . . . .” 61
In assessing the constitutionality of Minnesota’s civil commitment
scheme, the court stated:
O ne reason why we must be so careful about civil commitment is
that it can be used by the state to segregate undesirables from soci54. Id. at 1169.
55. Id. at 1150–51. Part of the problem in the MSO P was the limited availability of
beds at lesser-restrictive facilities for offenders who were qualified to transition. U pon
the filing of the lawsuit in 2011, the state began constructing a new, less-restrictive
facility to which qualified offenders could transition. Id. at 1150. D espite funding,
proper facilities, and plans for transitioning qualified offenders, the governor of Minnesota halted the transition until further study and revision of the applicable civil
commitment statutes. Id. at 1152. This delay not only created a backlog of offenders
who were entitled to conditional release, but it produced a pervasive sense of hopelessness for other offenders, and even for service providers at the facilities. Id. at 1151.
56. Id. at 1163–64. For example, between January 2010 and June 2014, there were
441 committed offenders who were potentially eligible for discharge. H owever, the
state did not file a single petition for discharge. Nor had the state ever filed a petition
for a reduction in custody for a qualified offender before 2013. Id. at 1164.
57. Id. at 1147–48.
58. Id. at 1147.
59. Since the filing of the lawsuit in K arsjens, the state unconditionally released
one person—E ric Terhaar. The state opposed Terhaar’s unconditional release but did
not appeal the decision. A nother offender—sixty-four-year-old Clarence O pheim—
was conditionally released with supervision to a half-way house, and seven other offenders are qualified for provisional discharge with conditional release but are not
able to be placed in the community because housing restrictions make it so difficult to
locate qualified housing. Briana Bierschbach, T he L egal Fight over M innesota’s Sex
O ffender Program Could H ave R am ifications T hroughout the Country, M INN . P O ST
(Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2017/09/legal-fight-overminnesotas-sex-offender-program-could-have-ramifications-th/ [https://perma.cc/
A 6D P-8G FZ ].
60. Monica D avey, M innesota’s H olding of Sex O ffenders A fter Prison Is R uled
Unconstitutional, N.Y. T IME S (June 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/us/
minnesotas-holding-of-sex-offenders-after-prison-is-ruled-unconstitutional.html
[https://perma.cc/L8R C-L7NC].
61. K arsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1144.
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ety by labeling them with a mental abnormality or personality
disorder. . . .
It is fundamental to our notions of a free society that we do not
imprison citizens because we fear that they might commit a crime in
the future. A lthough the public might be safer if the government,
using the latest “scientific” methods of predicting human behavior,
locked up potential . . . sex offenders, our system of justice, enshrined in rights guaranteed by our Constitution, prohibits the imposition of preventive detention except in very limited
circumstances. This strikes at the very heart of what it means to be a
free society . . . . [W]hen the criminal justice system and the civil
commitment system carry out their responsibilities, the constitutional rights of all citizens, including sex offenders, can be upheld
without compromising public safety or disrespecting the rights, concerns, and fears of victims.62

It was upon this backdrop that the court held that Minnesota’s
civil commitment statutes and sexual offender program were
unconstitutional.63
A nticipating public concern over the immediate release of more
than 700 committed sexual offenders, the court issued with its holding
a note of caution: “The public should know that the Moose Lake and
St. Peter facilities will not be immediately closed.” 64 Instead, the court
held that, for the truly dangerous sexual offenders, Minnesota should
implement appropriate procedures to guarantee continued detention
with constitutional protections. For those offenders who no longer
meet the criteria for commitment, the court held that they should be
released with a “significant support system and appropriate conditions
of supervision, all of which can be accomplished without compromising public safety or the concerns and fears of the victims.” 65
A lso, in 2011, similar claims had been raised in Missouri, in V an
O rden v. Schafer.66 In V an O rden, sexual offenders who were determined to be sexually violent predators (“SVPs”) and who were civilly
committed under the Missouri D epartment of Mental H ealth Sex O ffender R ehabilitation and Treatment Service (“SO R TS”) asserted,
likewise, that the SVP A ct 67 was unconstitutional as written and as
applied to SO R TS.68 Specifically, these civilly committed persons as62. Id. at 1143–44.
63. Id. at 1173.
64. Id. at 1144.
65. Id. at 1145. A s of January 2018, there were 726 people in the secured treatment program facilities in Moose Lake and St. Peter. Nine of those persons are living
in supervised community facilities. Twelve others have been granted provisional discharges but are still waiting for appropriate placements. See Judges A pprove R elease
of R apist from Sex O ffender Program , KSTP (Jan. 9, 2018, 3:36 PM), https://kstp.com/
news/supreme-court-appeal-panel-judges-approve-release-rapist-thomas-duvall-fromminnesota-sex-offender-program/4737057/?cat=1 [https://perma.cc/R Z 9G -87KT].
66. Van O rden v. Schafer, 129 F. Supp. 3d 839 (E .D . Mo. 2015).
67. M O . A NN . STA T . §§ 632.480–632.525 (West 2014 & Supp. 2019).
68. V an O rden, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 869–70.
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serted that “particular modalities of treatment at SO R TS [were] inadequate due to staff and funding shortages” and that “the entire
SO R TS treatment program [was] a sham” because in its sixteen years
of operation, it had “neither established the risk assessment and release procedures contemplated by the SVP A ct, nor successfully
treated and released, following such treatment, any residents back
into the community.” 69
In V an O rden, the U nited States D istrict Court for the E astern D istrict of Missouri held that the Missouri SVP A ct permitted the state to
civilly commit, potentially indefinitely, persons who are both mentally
ill and dangerous so as to be deemed likely to commit acts of violence
in the future.70 The court held that the SVP A ct was constitutional on
its face in that it provided for conditional release, and that the particular treatment modalities of SO R TS were not so lacking as to violate
the D ue Process Clause.71 H owever, the court held that, as applied,
“the SO R TS civil commitment program suffers from systemic failures
regarding risk assessment and release that have resulted in the continued confinement of individuals who no longer meet the criteria for
commitment, in violation of the D ue Process Clause.” 72 U ltimately, in
July 2017, in V an O rden v. Stringer, the D istrict Court found three
constitutional deficiencies.73
First, the D istrict Court found unconstitutional the manner in which
the D efendants conducted annual reviews to assess whether a civilly
committed person continued to satisfy the statutory requirement for
commitment. The court held that “SO R TS officials responsible for
conducting annual reviews were not consistently applying the correct
legal standard for evaluating Plaintiffs’ risk level under the statutory
criteria.” 74
Second, with respect to the release portion of the SO R TS treatment
program and its complete lack of any community reintegration
program,
69. Id. at 843. The Missouri program began in 1999 and, in the sixteen years since
then, had housed some 200 offenders at the facilities in Farmington and Fulton, Missouri. H owever, by September 2015, no committed offender had ever left the facilities
and returned into the community as a result of successfully completing the treatment
program. Id. at 844, 845–46. Since the filing of the claims in V an O rden, two offenders
left the program conditionally. Jesse Bogan, U.S. Judge R ules H andling of State’s Sexual Predator Program is Unconstitutional, ST . L O U IS P O ST -D ISPA TCH (Sept. 12, 2015),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/u-s-judge-rules-handling-ofstate-s-sexual-predator/article_8ea46baa-5e3f-5773-a1d1-9465c9d08fe9.html [https://
perma.cc/3WA D -3A R U ].
70. V an O rden, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 844.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. The court in V an O rden issued its opinion in a D ecember 22, 2015, amended
memorandum opinion, which was vacated in part by the court in V an O rden v.
Stringer. See Van O rden v. Stringer, 262 F. Supp. 3d 887, 894 (E .D . Mo. 2017).
74. Id. at 889.
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[t]he Court concluded that D efendant’s stated goal of treating and
safely reintegrating Plaintiffs back into the community was observed in theory but not in practice, and that the release portion of
SO R TS was a sham. . . . In particular, the Court found that SO R TS
undisputedly had residents who, because of their age and physical
infirmity or because of their treatment progress, had reduced their
risk below the standard required for commitment, but that D efendants consistently opposed the release of such residents and had not
designed any procedures for their community reintegration.75

Third, the court concluded that the D irector of the D epartment of
Mental H ealth abdicated his statutory duty to authorize qualified offenders to petition the court for release.76 “The Court found that the
D irector had not authorized a single person committed under the SVP
A ct to petition for conditional release, and that D efendants were instead stalling or blocking D irector authorization even when SO R TS
treatment providers and annual reviewers concluded that a resident
qualified for conditional release.” 77
Subsequent to the U nited States D istrict Court’s July 2017 decision
in V an O rden, the court heard the appeal in the K arsjen case in Minnesota. In January 2017, in K arsjen v. Piper, the U nited States Court
of A ppeals for the E ighth Circuit reversed the D istrict Court’s opinion, holding that strict scrutiny was not the proper standard of review
of the facial and as-applied due process claims raised by the sexual
offenders.78 Instead, the court held that the proper standard to be applied to the facial challenge was rational basis. For the as-applied challenge, the court required that the defendants’ conduct be conscienceshocking and that the state defendants violated one or more of the
plaintiffs’ fundamental rights.79 U nder the proper rational basis standard of review, the Minnesota Civil Commitment and Treatment A ct
did not, on its face, violate due process, and the managers’ actions did
not violate due process as applied to civilly committed sexual offenders under the Minnesota Sex O ffender program.80 H owever, in May
2017, the U nited States D istrict Court stayed all proceedings pending
a possible decision by the U nited States Supreme Court.81
75. Id.
76. Id. at 889–90. Pursuant to Missouri law, “[i]f the director of the [D MH ] determines that the person’s mental abnormality has so changed that the person is not
likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released, the director shall authorize the
person to petition the court for release.” M O . A NN . STA T . § 632.501 (West 2014).
77. V an O rden, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 890.
78. Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 408 (8th Cir. 2017). For an excellent discussion
of the civil commitment power and the constitutional framework within which it is
applied, specifically within the E ighth Circuit’s failed analysis in K arsjens, see E ric S.
Janus, B eyond Strict Scrutiny: Forbidden Purposes and the “Civil Com m itm ent”
Power, 21 N E W C R IM . L. R E V . 345, 348 (2018).
79. K arsjens, 845 F.3d at 408.
80. Id. at 410–11.
81. Id. Petitioners filed a Writ of Certiorari in May 2017, and the Court denied the
petition in O ctober 2017. See Karsjen v. Johnson, 138 S. Ct. 106, 107 (2017).
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In light of the proceedings in Minnesota, the U nited States D istrict
Court for the E astern D istrict of Missouri reluctantly held, in July
2017, in V an O rden v. Stringer, that K arsjens compelled reconsideration of the court’s earlier opinion in V an O rden.82 The court held that
the E ighth Circuit’s holding in K arsjens—that the Plaintiffs’ claims do
not implicate a fundamental liberty interest—was controlling, and
that, without a fundamental liberty interest, Plaintiffs’ as-applied
claim fails no matter how shocking the state defendants’ conduct.” 83
Furthermore, the court questioned whether “deliberate indifference
can rise to a constitutionally shocking level,” or whether a “ ‘purpose
to cause harm’ is needed to shock the conscience.” The court stated
that it may have held that “continuing to confine the aged and infirm
who are undisputedly no longer dangerous shocks the conscience,”
but instead, it held that K arsjens precluded such a holding unless overruled by the E ighth Circuit, the U nited States Supreme Court, or by
Congress.84
O n September 27, 2017, the Plaintiffs in V an O rden v. Stringer filed
an appeal to the U nited States Court of A ppeals for the E ighth Circuit.85 Five days later, on O ctober 2, 2017, the U nited States Supreme
Court declined to consider the constitutionality of the Minnesota Sex
O ffender Program in K arsjens v. Piper.86 Consequently, until the
Court elects to entertain another case, the constitutionality of the civil
commitment of sexually violent predators and the improvement of the
admittedly flawed state treatment programs are now subject to the
authority of the state and, as this A rticle will demonstrate, the effect
of the uncanny valley.
B. O ther States E nforcing Civil Com m itm ent L aws 87
While Minnesota and Missouri had civilly committed more than
1,500 sexual offenders without having fully released a single person in
twenty years, Wisconsin has civilly committed less than half as many
offenders since its program began in 1994. Yet as of June 2017, Wisconsin had released 160 offenders, only three of whom recidivated
within three years of release; thirty-six more offenders were ready for
release but were unable to locate unrestricted housing.88 To those who
82. Van O rden v. Stinger, 262 F. Supp. 3d 887, 893 (E .D . Mo. 2017).
83. Id. at 893–94.
84. Id. at 894.
85. See Van O rden v. Stringer, No. 17-3093 (8th Cir. 2017). The court heard oral
argument on the appeal on September 26, 2018. Id.
86. Karsjens v. Piper, 138 S. Ct. 106 (2017).
87. See Siegel, supra note 42.
88. Cara Lombardo, W isconsin Struggles to Find N ew H om es for Sex O ffenders,
M ILWA U KE E J. SE NTINE L (June 11, 2017), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/
wisconsin/2017/06/11/wisconsin-struggles-find-new-homes-sex-offenders/387596001/
[https://perma.cc/JE N7-8D R D ].
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support release, these statistics evidence a treatment program that is
working.89
When the Wisconsin program started in 1994, committed offenders
were sent to a mental health facility.90 In 2001, the state built the 350person-capacity Sand R idge Secured Treatment Center, in Mauston,
Wisconsin, for $39 million.91 The state anticipated that by 2009, the
facility would reach capacity, so it built an additional 200-bed wing.
Since then, the state has civilly committed over 500 of Wisconsin’s
23,000 registered sexual offenders. H owever, the additional wing is
neither staffed nor occupied because of the successful discharge rate,
which nearly quadrupled from 2009 to 2013.92
Part of the reason offenders are discharging at such a high rate in
Wisconsin is that state officials have updated the assessment models
that are used to determine risk upon release. Previously, officials used
data from the 1980s, which indicated highly exaggerated recidivism
rates, but now officials use more current research and reliable data on
sexual offender recidivism.93 A dditionally, beginning in 2013, the state
imposed more conditions upon release, including monitoring, supervision, and mandated treatment.94 The annual fiscal budget for the program was $37.3 million in 2007, but it increased to $50.9 million by

89. The R esearch D irector at Sand R idge observed, “This may reflect the maturing of treatment programs and the gradual discovery that under the right conditions it
is possible to selectively release these individuals without exposing the community to
greater danger.” Nora H ertel, R ethink ing Sex O ffenders: Inside the W alls of Sand
R idge: “W e H ave a H uge Challenge H ere”, W IS. W A TCH (Feb. 3, 2014), https://
www.wisconsinwatch.org/2014/02/inside-the-walls-of-sand-ridge-we-have-a-huge-challenge-here/ [https://perma.cc/A 5L7-8H MS] [hereinafter H ertel, Inside W alls of Sand
R idge].
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. From 2004 to 2008, Wisconsin released thirty-one offenders; from 2009 to
2013, Wisconsin released 114 offenders, most of whom were discharged with electronic monitoring but with no further treatment. O f the sixty-seven offenders who
were released by 2010, forty-nine had committed no crime within three years—a standard variable used in assessing recidivism. O f the eighteen offenders released who did
commit a crime, five were convicted of a sex crime. Nora H ertel, R ethink ing Sex O ffenders, W isconsin Freeing M ore Sex O ffenders From M ental L ock up, W IS. W A TCH
(Feb. 2, 2014), https://www.wisconsinwatch.org/2014/02/wisconsin-freeing-more-sexoffenders-from-mental-lockup/ [https://perma.cc/8P9A -Q WQ V] [hereinafter H ertel,
W isconsin Freeing M ore Sex O ffenders]; see also Nora H ertel & G ilman H alsted,
Photos: Inside Sand R idge, W here the Sexually V iolent A re T reated, W IS. W A TCH (Feb.
2, 2014), https://www.wisconsinwatch.org/2014/02/state-freeing-more-sex-offendersfrom-mental-lockup/ [https://perma.cc/D L6H -25Z P]. In 2013, the state began to issue
more supervised releases, with continued treatment and monitoring. H ertel, W isconsin Freeing M ore Sex O ffenders, supra note 92.
93. H ertel, Inside W alls of Sand R idge, supra note 89; H ertel, W isconsin Freeing
M ore Sex O ffenders, supra note 92.
94. H ertel, Inside W alls of Sand R idge, supra note 89; H ertel, W isconsin Freeing
M ore Sex O ffenders, supra note 92.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-3\TWL305.txt

562

unknown

Seq: 22

T E X A S A &M L A W R E V IE W

13-MA Y-19

14:24

[Vol. 6

2012, despite the steady decrease in population.95 Thus, there is financial incentive to discharge qualified offenders, whereas, in 2014, it cost
the State of Wisconsin $147,460 per year ($404 per day) to house one
committed offender, but the cost of supervising an offender who was
released was only $119,000 per year.96
H owever, many feel the financial savings is not worth the risk of
release.97 There is a reason the Sand R idge facility functions as a hospital in a civil setting, yet the local community requires that it be structured with a maximum security perimeter, much like a prison. A nd
there is a reason that offenders otherwise qualified for release remain
committed: there is no available unrestricted housing to which they
can be released safely. I propose that part of the reason is the uncanny
valley effect. H owever, Wisconsin officials maintain that with effective
treatment and constitutional management, releasing qualified offenders poses no unacceptable risk. In fact, the Wisconsin O ffice of Crime
Victim Services—a division of the State D epartment of Justice—assists victims and the public to come to terms with the release of
known offenders.98 Thus, the state must reconcile the conflicting,
seemingly incommensurable interests at stake—the civil liberty of sexual offenders and the safety of the community into which sexual offenders are released. Between these two principles lies a vast and
inexplicable component of human nature that is subject to the uncanny valley. Bridging this uncanny valley is the dilemma that policymakers in every state must reconcile.
III.

T H E U NCA NNY V A LLE Y H YPO TH E SIS

Masahito Mori’s hypothesis of the uncanny valley sprung from his
experience engineering robotic/prosthetic hands and fingers.99 A t the
time, in 1970, the most human-like commercial prosthetic hand, which
was developed in Vienna, nevertheless left one with a sense of creepiness and unfamiliarity. D espite the technological development of the
human-like silicone hand, Mori observed that “shaking such a cold,
lifeless hand . . . left one shocked, and horrified to a degree.” 100 Mori
95. See H ertel, Inside W alls of Sand R idge, supra note 89; H ertel, W isconsin Freeing M ore Sex O ffenders, supra note 92.
96. See H ertel, Inside W alls of Sand R idge, supra note 89; H ertel, W isconsin Freeing M ore Sex O ffenders, supra note 92; H ertel & H alsted, supra note 92.
97. H ertel, W isconsin Freeing M ore Sex O ffenders, supra note 92.
98. Id.
99. See generally W.A . Borody, T he Japanese R oboticist M asahiro M ori’s B uddhist
Inspired Concept of “T he Uncanny V alley”, 23 J. E VO LU TIO N & T E CH . 31 (2013).
100. Id. at 33.
R ecently, owing to great advances in fabrication technology, we cannot distinguish
at a glance a prosthetic hand from a real one. Some models simulate wrinkles, veins,
fingernails, and even fingerprints. Though similar to a real hand, the prosthetic hand’s
color is pinker, as if it had just come out of the bath.
O ne might say that the prosthetic hand has achieved a degree of resemblance to the
human form, perhaps on a par with false teeth. H owever, once we realize that the
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felt “robots and robotically enhanced humans ought to be experienced
as non-threatening.” 101 H e “advised his fellow roboticists to design
humanoid robots that act and perform as humans, but do not look and
move exactly like the human, in order that the humanoid robots will
be more socially accepted.” 102 Mori, a practicing Buddhist, associated
being fully “human” with Buddhist compassion. Thus, Mori suggested
that a wooden hand, modeled after the hand of the Buddha of Compassion 103 but with the same technological precision as the Viennese
design, might more likely be accepted by humans. From this subtext,
Mori developed his hypothesis of the uncanny valley.104
A . Conceptual D evelopm ent of the “Uncanny”
Mori proposed that the sudden and steep descent of our affinity for
nonhuman stimuli that are essentially indistinguishable from ourselves
“explains the secret lying deep beneath the uncanny valley.” H e
pondered, “Why were we equipped with this eerie sensation?” and
hand that looked real at first site is actually artificial, we experience an eerie sensation. For example, we could be startled during a handshake by its limp boneless grip
together with its texture and coldness. When this happens, we lose our sense of affinity, and the hand becomes uncanny.
Mori Translation, supra note 14, at 98–99.
101. Borody, supra note 99, at 33.
102. Id.
103. Mori’s design modeled the hand of A valokite s̀vara, the Boddhisattva of Compassion, who always holds a Lotus in the left hand and whose right hand is often
lowered, so as to offer a blessing or gesture of compassion. Id. at 33 n.7.
104. In a letter that Mori sent to sociologist Karl MacD orman in 2005, Mori expressed a different perspective on his representation of his theory. Mori later suggested that the healthy human, represented at the highest peak on the scale of
affinity, should be replaced by Buddhist statues that evoke the enlightenment of compassion. Likewise, the corpse should no longer assume the most negative point on the
scale, whereas the corpse no longer suffers the burden of having to make decisions
during life. Mori also expressed that, now, in the later stage of life, he was no longer
struck by the significance of the uncanny. Id. at 39. Freud expressed a similar change
of perspective of the uncanny, stating that the older he became, the less he experienced a sense of the uncanny in his life. SIG MU ND F R E U D , T H E U NCA NNY 124 (D avid
McClintock trans., Penguin Books, 2003) (1919). E rnst Jentsche and others would
posit that because fear of the unknown is what drives the uncanny, one’s experience
of the uncanny fades as exposure to the uncanny increases. See E R NST J E NTSCH E , O N
TH E P SYCH O LO G Y O F TH E U NCA NNY 2 (R oy Sellars trans.) (1906), http://
www.art3idea.psu.edu/locus/Jentsch_uncanny.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQ 3D -KSCN];
see also E rico G uizzo, W ho’s A fraid of the Uncanny V alley?, IE E E SPE CTR U M (A pr.
2, 2010), https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/humanoids/040210-who-isafraid-of-the-uncanny-valley [https://perma.cc/8XE 4-6R 63] (sharing critical views of
Mori’s theory by other roboticists, like D avid H anson, who stated, “In my experience,
people get used to the robots very quickly. . . . A s in, within minutes.”); E rik Sofge,
T he T ruth A bout R obots and the Uncanny V alley: A nalysis, P O PU LA R M E CH A NICS
(Jan. 20, 2010), https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/robots/a5001/4343054/
[https://perma.cc/R X7T-BA W6] (suggesting, based on the author’s personal experience, that the uncanny, when confronting MIT’s social robot, Nexi, presented nothing
more than “a fleeting cognitive glitch that has no bearing on the way humans will live
with machines”).
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asked whether this uncanny reaction is essential for human beings. To
these questions, Mori asserted, “I have no doubt it is an integral part
of our instinct for self-preservation.” 105 H owever, Mori’s perspective
obviously derived from concepts of the “uncanny” first premised in
fields other than robotics.
Mori was the first to theorize the effect of the uncanny valley mathematically, as a monotonically increasing function, within the context
of robotics—his theory demonstrates that this is a false impression.106
H owever, Mori certainly was not the first to contemplate this cognitive phenomenon. In 1906, in his essay Z ur Psychologie des Unheim lichen—translated O n the Psychology of the Uncanny—E rnst Jentsch
first conceptualized the “uncanny” as a psychological phenomenon
that primarily represents one’s reaction to situations or stimuli that
present unfamiliar context.107 For Jentsche, unfamiliar context produces the feeling of being threatened by enigmatic and incomprehensible objects, which results in psychological disorientation and an
internal psychical conflict.108
Sigmund Freud elaborated on Jentsche’s limited concept of the “uncanny” in his 1919 essay D as Unheim liche, translated, “T he Uncanny.” 109 Contrasting the root word, “heimlich” (meaning “familiar,”
“native,” “belonging to the [home]”), with the G erman adjective, “unheimlich,” (meaning “what is concealed and kept out of sight”),110
Freud contended that the uncanny presents as something that is familiar to us, yet conceals within its appearance that which is opposite.
Thus, the uncanny “exhibits one which is identical with its opposite
. . . .” 111 Freud’s conception of the uncanny is more than simply intellectual uncertainty, as Jentsche proposed. Instead, Freud identified
the uncanny as being more specifically concerned with the idea of a
105. Mori clarifies that the “sense of eeriness is probably a form of instinct that
protects us from proximal, rather than distal, sources of danger. Proximal sources of
danger are corpses, members of different species, and other entities we can closely
approach. D istal sources of danger include windstorms and floods.” Mori Translation,
supra note 14, at 100.
106. “The mathematical term m onotonically increasing function describes a relation
in which the function y = f(x) increases continuously with the variable x.” Id. at 98
(emphasis in original). Mori actually theorizes that viewing the goal of robotics of
creating humanoid robots as a monotonically increasing function is a false impression
and that the uncanny valley is a phenomenon that is not represented by such a function. Id.
107. J E NTSCH E , supra note 104, at 2.
108. Id. at 13.
109. 17 Sigmund Freud, D as Unheim liche (T he ‘Uncanny’), in T H E STA ND A R D E D ITIO N O F TH E C O MPLE TE P SYCH O LO G ICA L W O R KS O F SIG MU ND F R E U D : A N I NFA NTILE N E U R O SIS A ND O TH E R W O R KS, 220–41 (James Strachey trans., H ogarth Press
1925) (1919).
110. Freud derives this meaning from the work of Philosopher F. W. J. Shelling,
who proposed that “everything is unheim lich [(uncanny)] that ought to have remained
secret and hidden but has come to light.” Id. at 224–25.
111. Id. at 224.
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“double,” as addressed by O tto R ank in his work, D er D oppelgänger.112 Freud proposed that the uncanniness manifested by a
“double”—most specifically, “when an inanimate object becomes too
much like an animate one” 113 or “with persons . . . who are to be
considered identical by reason of looking alike”—causes the self to
become confounded and substitute the foreign self for one’s own.114
O ne’s reaction, therefore, is an impulse toward self-preservation of
the ego by projecting the identical object as something foreign to
one’s self.115
Likewise, Freud also contended that uncanniness manifests in the
helpless feeling one experiences from the otherwise innocent, involuntary recurrence of the same situations, things, or events—what we
generally might understand as mere chance or coincidence, or, perhaps, what we understand as the common experience of “deja-vu”—
wherein something entirely foreign to us brings us back to something
with which we are familiar. Freud proposed that human beings have
an instinctual compulsion, in the unconscious mind, to ascribe a secret
meaning to such occurrences. This compulsion is man’s “narcissistic
overevaluation of his own mental processes”—what Freud calls the
“omnipotence of thoughts” 116—with which man strives to reconcile
his experience or perspective of the world with reality. A ttributing all
of this to psychoanalytic theory, Freud concluded that the uncanny is
not at all the result of our experience of the unfamiliar or foreign.
R ather, the uncanny results from an expression of something familiar
that has already been established in the mind but has been repressed
and, thereby, estranged.117 In this, Freud accommodates Friedrich
Schelling’s concept of the uncanny as something that ought to have
been kept concealed but nevertheless has come to light.118
112. Naturally, Freud’s primary assessment of the uncanny—most particularly depicted in H offman’s story of T he Sand-M an—N achtstück en—is that it represents a
“castration complex,” also associated with the fear of losing one’s eyes. Id. at 230; see
also Sadeq R ahimi, T he E go, the O cular, and the Uncanny: W hy A re M etaphors of
V ision Central in A ccounts of the Uncanny?, 94 I NT ’L J. P SYCH O A NA LYSIS 453, 476
(2013). This notion of the uncanny has no direct relevance to Mori’s hypothesis, thus,
I do not address it at all in this A rticle. H owever, Freud’s concept of the “double,”
which he also describes as manifesting the uncanny, is quite relevant. Therefore, this
notion of Freud and other theorists is the focus of this discussion.
113. Freud, supra note 109, at 234–35.
114. Id. at 234.
115. Id. at 234–36.
116. Id. at 240. “We appear to attribute an ‘uncanny’ quality to impressions that
seek to confirm the omnipotence of thoughts and the animistic mode of thinking in
general, after we have reached a stage at which, in our judg[ ]m ent, we have abandoned such beliefs.” Id. at 241 n.1.
117. Id. at 220. Freud defined the “uncanny” as “that class of the frightening which
leads back to what is known of old and long familiar.” Id.
118. Id. at 225 (Schelling concluded that “everything is uncanny that ought to have
remained hidden and secret, and yet comes to light.”).
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O ther theories have contributed to our understanding of the uncanny. Psychoanalytically, expanding on Freud’s theories, Jacques Lacan described the uncanny as an irreducible anxiety resulting from not
knowing how to distinguish one’s desires (or perceptions of what is
lacking) from reality.119 Sociologically, Julia Kristeva’s concept of abjection is closely Freudian and Lacanian, describing one’s adverse reaction to the abject by forcefully casting out that which confronts the
self and the symbolic order, which at one time was part of one’s identity but is now rejected.120 Imogen Tyler explored this notion of the
abject as a concept of marginalization and social exclusion, particularly of minority groups perceived as confronting the social order.121
Indeed there are many theories that explore and explain the concept of the uncanny that appear plausibly relevant to contexts other
than robotics. Freud’s theories would appear to be relevant and applicable if one were to explore the psychoanalytic components underlying society’s reaction to sexual offenders. H owever, all of these
theories simply explain the concept of the uncanny. While these theories are relevant and critical to our understanding of the concept of
the uncanny, what I propose in this A rticle, more specifically, is that
Mori’s hypothesis of the uncanny valley effect, in the context of robotics, may inform the current dilemma of the sexual offender civil commitment process that I describe in the Introduction. I further propose
that Mori’s hypothesis not only presents an analogous dilemma, but it
also informs us on how we might address it. To address this dilemma,
however, we must first understand more specifically how Mori’s hypothesis of the uncanny valley applies, and how, if at all, it might be
expanded to accommodate the unique context of sexual offenders.
B. A pplication of M ori’s Uncanny V alley H ypothesis
1. R obotics D esign
There has been a long history of theories addressing the notion of
“uncanniness.” 122 It is important that we understand these theories as
context to understanding Mori’s hypothesis of the uncanny valley.
H owever, Mori’s landmark study was not a theory about the nature of
119. See Jacques Lacan, Seminar X: A nxiety (Jan. 30, 1963) (transcript available
with the T exas A &M L aw R eview).
120. J U LIA K R ISTE VA , P O WE R S O F H O R R O R : A N E SSA Y O N A BJE CTIO N (Leon S.
R oudiez trans., Colum. U niv. Press 1982) (1941).
121. I MO G E N T YLE R , R E VO LTING SU BJE CTS: SO CIA L A BJE CTIO N A ND R E SISTA NCE
IN N E O LIBE R A L B R ITA IN (2013). See also L O ÏC W A CQ U A NT , P U NISH ING T H E P O O R :
T H E N E O LIBE R A L G O VE R NME NT O F SO CIA L I NSE CU R ITY 209–39 (2009).
122. For works broadly addressing the concept of the “uncanny,” see, e.g., K A TH E R INE W ITH Y , H E ID E G G E R O N B E ING U NCA NNY (2015); A NNE LE E N M A SSCH E LE IN ,
T H E U NCO NCE PT : T H E F R E U D IA N U NCA NNY IN L A TE -T WE NTIE TH -C E NTU R Y T H E O R Y (Charles Shepherdson ed., 2011); N ICH O LA S R O YLE , T H E U NCA NNY (2003);
SIG MU ND F R E U D , T H E U NCA NNY 124 (D avid McClintock trans., Penguin Books
2003) (1919).
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uncanniness, per se. R ather, Mori’s study was, very specifically, a
study of the aesthetics of robot design. Mori hypothesized that a
human subject’s affinity for a robot increases as the design of a robot
becomes more human-like, but that when the human-like robot becomes too human-like, the subject experiences a feeling of eeriness or
uncanniness and reacts negatively toward the “nearly-indistinguishable-but-not-quite-fully-human-looking” robot.
Figure 1 represents a simplified version of Mori’s hypothesis.
F IG U R E 1
Simplified Illustration of the U ncanny Valley Hypothesis

Mori constructed his theory using stimuli that subjects would initially identify as obviously nonhuman. O n a diagram charting human
likeness on the horizontal axis and familiarity on the vertical axis,123
the foundational stimuli in Mori’s theory is an industrial robot. In
123. O n Mori’s graph, he describes the vertical function with the word
“Shinwakan,” which is translated to mean “affinity,” but other theorists have equated
the function with “familiarity” or “likeability,” depending on the salience of the function within a particular study. See, e.g., Christopher Bartneck et al., M y R obotic D oppelgänger— A Critical L ook at the Uncanny V alley, P R O CE E D ING S O F TH E 18TH IE E E
I NT ’L SYMP . R O BO T & H U M . I NTE R A CTIVE C O MM . 269, 270 (2009) (questioning
whether the concept Mori was trying to convey was “lost in translation”).
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terms of robot design, Mori observed that “these robots just extend,
contract, and rotate their arms; without faces or legs, they do not look
very human. . . . [G ]iven their lack of resemblance to human beings, in
general, people hardly feel any affinity for them.” 124 H owever, one’s
affinity for clearly nonhuman stimuli that possess more human-like
features, such as a child’s toy robot or stuffed animal, with arms, legs,
a torso, and a face, will increase and thus is plotted half-way up the
scale of positive affinity, at the first (or medium) peak.
H ealthy human persons are positioned at the crest of the second (or
maximum) peak, garnering full affinity. A s the stimuli progress toward greater human likeness across the horizontal axis, Mori represents them on two different planes—the solid plane representing
stimuli that are immobile (i.e., a stuffed animal, corpse, and prosthetic
hand), and the dotted plane representing stimuli that are able to move
physically (i.e., a humanoid robot, zombie, bunraku puppet,125 and a
healthy or fully human person). Mori theorized that movement in the
stimuli amplifies the subjects’ reactions to the stimuli. Compared to
the plane representing immobile stimuli, the plane representing stimuli that move produces a higher peak for positive affinity and a deeper
valley for negative affinity, thus steepening the slope of the uncanny
valley.126
Thus, on the plane for stimuli that move, we see in Mori’s diagram
that a humanoid robot, which has more anthropomorphic or “humanlike” qualities than an industrial robot, provokes progressively greater
affinity the more it resembles a human. H owever, we see Mori’s concept of the uncanny valley manifesting at the crest of the first peak,
which Mori asserts is the point at which the nonhuman stimuli develops to so closely resemble a human that it becomes virtually indistinguishable and thus provokes a sense of eeriness, uncomfortableness,
or repulsion. In Mori’s diagram, this is represented by a steep descent
into the area of negative affinity. Note that corpses and zombies,
which produce the greatest sense of eeriness or repulsion, are represented at the deepest valley of negative affinity on the respective
planes, with the negative response to a zombie amplified by its ability
to move (perhaps even lurching robotically forward with typically outstretched arms), as compared to a corpse, which, of course, does not

124. Mori Translation, supra note 14, at 98.
125. “Bunraku” is a traditional Japanese form of musical puppet theater dating
from the seventeenth century. Id. at 99; see Fig.1; see also B unrak u, J A PA NE SE P U PPE T T H E A TE R , http://factsanddetails.com/japan/cat20/sub131/item713.html#chapter-1
(last visited Sept. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4SCE -SSJX].
126. For purposes of this A rticle and the application of Mori’s theory to the context
of sexual offenders, however, the capacity for physical movement bears no particular
contextual relevance. Therefore, relevant stimuli plot only on one plane.
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move.127 Yet both represent the maximum negative affinity for their
respective planes.128
Mori then offers the example of the bunraku puppet as plotting
much higher in positive affinity as we ascend again toward the healthy
human. Mori asserts that, although the puppet resembles a human in
its form, “its realism in terms of its size, skin texture, and so on, does
not even reach that of a prosthetic hand.” Mori asserts that:
when we enjoy a puppet show in the theater, we are seated at a
certain distance from the stage. The puppet’s absolute size is ignored, and its total appearance, including hand and eye movements,
is close to that of a human being. So, given our tendency as an audience to become absorbed in this form of art, we might feel a high
level of affinity for the puppet.129

For Mori, the puppet produces high affinity because, upon close inspection, in reality, we are able to distinguish the puppet from a
healthy human.
Finally, Mori contends that, “[a]s healthy persons, we are represented at the crest of the second peak . . . .” 130 Thus, Mori’s hypothesis appears in Figure 2.

127. Some researchers caution against testing the uncanny valley theory by using
inherently negative stimuli, like zombies or corpses. See, e.g., K ätsyri, et al., supra
note 14, at 11–12. This is particularly relevant to designing studies that test the existence of the uncanny valley in the context of sexual offenders because the hypothesis,
as applied, predetermines sexual offenders to be connotatively negative, like a monster or zombie.
128. For a discussion of Mori’s divergent attitude, later in life, about the plot location of the corpse on the uncanny valley scale, see Borody, supra note 99, at 38–39
(“The corpse is no longer an object to be considered ‘uncanny.’ It is now something
about which to rejoice: it no longer has to suffer, which is the fate of all living
beings.”).
129. Mori Translation, supra note 14, at 99.
130. Id. at 100.
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F IG U R E 2
Illustration of Masahito Mori’s U ncanny Valley Hypothesis
Representing Progressively Human-Like Stimuli

Mori’s study supported his hypothesis, and from it, he conceptualized
the “uncanny valley” effect.
A s with the concept of uncanniness itself, there has been a variety
of theories proposed to explain the cognitive mechanism underlying
Mori’s conclusions, including theories about male selection,131 mortality salience,132 pathogen aversion,133 identity paradoxes,134 normative
131. Male selection refers to the automatic appraisal of, and aversion to, mates with
low fertility, poor hormonal health, or ineffective immune systems, based on visible
features, such as the face and body, that are predictive of such averse traits. See F A CIA L A TTR A CTIVE NE SS: E VO LU TIO NA R Y , C O G NITIVE , A ND SO CIA L P E R SPE CTIVE S
59–84 (G illian R hodes & Leslie A . Z ebrowitz eds., 2002); R obert D . G reen et al.,
Sensitivity to the Proportions of Faces T hat V ary in H um an L ik eness, 24 C O MPU TE R S
H U M . B E H A V . 2456 (2008).
132. This theory contends that viewing what appears to be a partially assembled
robot/human elicits an innate fear of the inevitability of death and the image of
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expectations,135 cognitive dissonance and conflicted perceptual
cues,136 and social distinctiveness.137 Many studies suggest the unhumans as just soulless machines. See Karl F. MacD orman & H iroshi Ishiguro, T he
Uncanny A dvantage of Using A ndroids in Social and Cognitive Science R esearch, 7
I NTE R A CTIO N STA T . 297, 313 (2006); see also Karl F. MacD orman, M ortality Salience
and the Uncanny V alley, P R O CE E D ING S O F TH E 2005 5TH IE E E -R A S I NTE R NA TIO NA L
C O NFE R E NCE O N H U MA NO ID R O BO TS, T SU KU BA , J A PA N 399, 399–405 (testing the
mortality salience theory).
133. This theory explains the cognitive aversion to organism defects, which indicate
disease or genetic dissimilarity. See Karl F. MacD orman et al., T oo R eal for Com fort:
Uncanny R esponses to Com puter-G enerated Faces, 25 C O MPU TE R S H U M . B E H A V . 695
(2009).
134. A n identity paradox violates one’s sense of human identity by linking qualitatively different categories by degree of human likeness.
A ccording to R amey, an uncanny valley may result from any cognitive act
that links qualitatively different categories by quantitative metrics that call
into question the originally differentiated categories. This effect can be especially pronounced when one of those categories is one’s self or one’s humanity. From a phenomenological standpoint, humanlike robots may force one
to confront one’s own being by creating intermediate conceptualizations that
are neither human nor robot. (R amey, 2005)
U nlike Mori, R amey does not believe the uncanny valley to be a phenomenon that is limited to humanoid robotics.
MacD orman & Ishiguro, supra note 132, at 310 (quoting C. H . R amey, T he Uncanny
V alley of Sim ilarities Concerning A bortion, B aldness, H eaps of Sand, and H um anlik e
R obots, P R O CE E D ING S O F TH E V IE WS O F TH E U NCA NNY V A LLE Y W O R KSH O P , IE E E R A S I NTE R NA TIO NA L C O NFE R E NCE O N H U MA NO ID R O BO TS, T SU KU BA , J A PA N 8,
8–13).
135. This theory describes the reactions associated with the normative expectations
humans have for other entities that share or appear to have human characteristics.
U nder this theory, if a nonhuman entity’s human characteristics are noticeable and
distinguish the entity, it evokes empathy. H owever, if the entity appears almost
human, it elicits detailed normative expectations for human standards. Failure to satisfy those expectations elicits a sense of strangeness or uncanniness. See, e.g.,
MacD orman & Ishiguro, supra note 132, at 303; A yse Pinar Saygin et al., T he T hing
T hat Should N ot B e: Predictive Coding and the Uncanny V alley in Perceiving H um an
and H um anoid R obot A ctions, 7 SO C . C O G NITIVE A FFE CTIVE N E U R O SCIE NCE 413
(2011).
136. Theories of conflicted perceptual cues or cognitive representations describe
the negative effect associated with perceiving conflicted or hybrid cues that blur the
identification of category membership, such as when experiencing genetically modified organisms (frankenfoods) or transgendered entities. See, e.g., Tyler J. Burleigh et
al., D oes the Uncanny V alley E xist? A n E m pirical T est of the R elationship between
E eriness and the H um an L ik eness of D igitally Created Faces, 29 C O MPU TE R S H U M .
B E H A V . 759 (2013); A ndrew J. E lliot & Patricia G . D evine, O n the M otivational N ature of Cognitive D issonance: D issonance as Psychological D iscom fort, 67 J. P E R SO NA LITY & SO C . P SYCH O L . 382 (1994); A nne E . Ferrey et al., Stim ulus-Category
Com petition, Inhibition, and A ffective D evaluation: A N ovel A ccount of the Uncanny
V alley, F R O NTIE R S P SYCH O L . (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4358369/pdf/fpsyg-06-00249.pdf [https://perma.cc/3A A K-R H KC]; Jordan R .
Schoenherr & Tyler J. Burleigh, Uncanny Sociocultural Categories, F R O NTIE R S
P SYCH O L . (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4300910/
pdf/fpsyg-05-01456.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q PT-Z PY4]; Yuki Yamada et al., Categoriz ation D ifficulty Is A ssociated W ith N egative E valuation in the “Uncanny V alley” Phenom enon, 55 J A PA NE SE P SYCH O L . R E S. 20 (2013).
137. Social distinctiveness theory is akin to identity paradox theory but describes
other entities as a challenge to social identity or distinction. See, e.g., Francesco Fer-
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canny valley effect is innate in the human species,138 while other studies suggest it may be a learned behavior.139 D etermining which theory
or combination of theories best explains the uncanny valley effect in
the context of robots continues to be the goal of many researchers.
This A rticle demonstrates that such research may inform policies related to sexual offenders if the uncanny valley actually exists in the
sexual offender context. For example, determining through research
in robotics whether the uncanny valley effect is a learned behavior
may inform our research on the uncanny valley effect in the context of
sexual offenders and how we might correct the way society understands and reacts to offenders within the community. H owever, the
various theories explaining the uncanny valley are nevertheless beyond the scope of this initial A rticle. Instead, I assert here that,
whatever the explanation for the uncanny valley effect may be, Mori’s
hypothesis provides an applicable format for studying the existence of
the uncanny valley in the context of reintegrating civilly committed
sexual offenders into the community.
H istorically—notwithstanding the host of theories suggesting explanations for Mori’s hypothesis—for approximately thirty-five years after Mori published his research, there was very little attention
dedicated to the relevance of Mori’s conclusions. H owever, with the
advent of advanced technology in the field of robotics and robotics
design, the implications of Mori’s conclusions suddenly became quite
significant in the past decade, particularly for the motion picture and
video entertainment industries.140
Consider Mori’s hypothesis of the uncanny valley depicting
animated characters in motion pictures and other computer graphic
rari et al., B lurring H um an-M achine D istinctions: A nthropom orphic A ppearance in
Social R obots as a T hreat to H um an D istinctiveness, 8 I NT ’L J. SO C . R O BO TICS 287
(2016); Karl F. MacD orman & Steven O . E ntenzari, Individual D ifferences Predict
Sensitivity to the Uncanny V alley, 16 I NTE R A CTIO N STU D . 141 (2015); Fr éd éric Kaplan,
W ho Is A fraid of the H um anoid? Investigating Cultural D ifferences in the A cceptance
of R obots, 1 I NT ’L J. H U MA NO ID R O BO TICS 465 (2004).
138. See supra note 132.
139. See Kimberly A . Brink et al., Creepiness Creeps In: Uncanny V alley Feelings
A re A cquired in Childhood, C H ILD D E V ., D ec. 13, 2017; Shawn A . Steckenfinger &
A sif A . G hazanfar, M onk ey V isual B ehavior Falls Into the Uncanny V alley, 106 P R O CE E D ING S N A T . A CA D . SCI . 18362, 18362 (2009). R esearchers at Princeton U niversity
suspect there may be a biological component to the uncanny valley phenomenon that
occurs as an evolutionary adaptation in the brain. In the first study of the uncanny
valley phenomenon involving a subject other than a human, researchers have concluded that macaque monkeys also experience the effect of the uncanny valley. Id.
R esearchers believe that the results will be helpful in establishing the direction of
future research that test the theories discussed in this A rticle. Kitta MacPherson, L ik e
H um ans, M onk eys Fall into the ‘Uncanny V alley’, P R INCE TO N U . (O ct. 13, 2009, 11:00
A M), https://www.princeton.edu/news/2009/10/13/humans-monkeys-fall-uncanny-valley [https://perma.cc/8VYR -TVJN].
140. See, e.g., A NG E LA T INWE LL , T H E U NCA NNY V A LLE Y IN G A ME S A ND A NIMA TIO N 10–21 (2014).
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characters. Figure 3 presents the most typical depiction used in referencing this context.
F IG U R E 3
Typical Illustration of the U ncanny Valley Hypothesis Presenting
Stimuli in the Computer Graphic and Video
Entertainment Industries

Within popular culture, the train conductor character in the movie
Polar E xpress (2004), played by actor Tom H anks, is commonly described as evoking “uncanny valley” responses in viewers because of
how similarly the character in the movie resembles an actual human
being, even though the character is clearly animated. The uncanniness
evoked by the character is thought to have contributed to the disappointing acclaim of the production.141 Thus, plotted on Mori’s diagram, we see the Polar E xpress character plotted on the descent into
the uncanny valley. Plotted deepest in the uncanny valley is a character called “Cubo G irl,” often referred to as “Creepy G irl,” which is a
computer-generated image depicted on a flash page that follows with
its eyes and head the movement of the user’s mouse icon.142 The
141. See Jari K ätsyri, “T he Polar E xpress” Is B ipolar: Critical Film R eviews Influence Uncanny V alley Phenom enon in Sem i-R ealistic A nim ation Film s, M IND M O D E LING 2344, https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2017/papers/0446/paper0446.pdf (last visited
Feb. 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/U JF8-7T87]; Corpses, A ndroids, and the Polar E xpress: A Social N euroscience Perspective on the Uncanny V alley, D A R TMO U TH U ND E R G R A D U A TE J. SCI . (May 22, 2009), https://sites.dartmouth.edu/dujs/2009/05/22/
corpses-androids-and-the-polar-express-a-social-neuroscience-perspective-on-the-un
canny-valley/ [https://perma.cc/52CE -NA 2M].
142. For a video of a person interacting with “Creepy G irl,” see Keng Wong,
Creepy G irl on W ebsite, Y O U T U BE (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=PF1NQ FmO oA E [https://perma.cc/L43M-XX63].
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creepiness of the experience plots this character at the peak of the
valley. H owever, several Pixar Studio productions that relied on
human-like but quite stylized, non-realistic characters, such as The Incredibles (2004), A Bug’s Life (1998), and Toy Story (1995), were
well-received and highly successful.143 Thus, the character from The
Incredibles plots nearest to the first peak ascending on the affinity
scale.
Because Mori’s theory has not been fully scientifically studied,
some critics contend that it is merely conjecture and not useful in
robotics design.144 H owever, there is a growing body of literature that
indicates the contrary. A s discussed here, in the context of motion
pictures and computer-generated imagery, “empirical evidence for the
[uncanny valley] phenomenon has already begun to accumulate, especially from studies with featurally mismatching . . . and naturalistic
stimuli . . . .” 145 Such studies provide relevant information that appears to help designers assess how to approach the uncanny valley
without falling into it. A lternatively, continued research may eventually reveal the formula for successfully crossing the uncanny valley
and designing life-like androids or computer-generated models that
function successfully without evoking negative reactions in those with
whom they interact.

143. See Scott Mendelson, From ‘T oy Story’ T o ‘Cars 3,’ E very Pixar M ovie
R ank ed by B ox O ffice, F O R BE S (Nov. 21, 2017, 3:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/scottmendelson/2017/11/21/box-office-pixars-animated-films-ranked/
#750997832584 [https://perma.cc/WG P5-K87B].
144. See G uizzo, supra note 104; Sofge, supra note 104; Wang et al., supra note 15,
at 393, 403.
145. K ätsyri, supra note 141, at 2348 (citing K. F. MacD orman & D . Chattopadhyay, R educing Consistency in H um an R ealism Increases the Uncanny V alley
E ffect; Increasing Category Uncertainty D oes N ot, 146 C O G NITIO N 190 (2016); M. B.
Mathur & D . B. R eichling, N avigating A Social W orld W ith R obot Partners: A Q uantitative Cartography of the Uncanny V alley, 146 C O G NITIO N 22 (2016); E . Poliakoff et
al., Can L ook ing at A H and M ak e Y our Sk in Crawl? Peering Into the Uncanny V alley
for H ands, 42 P E R CE PTIO N 998 (2013); J. Seyama & R . S. Nagayama, T he Uncanny
V alley: E ffect of R ealism on the Im pression of A rtificial H um an Faces, 16 P R E SE NCE :
T E LE O PE R A TO R S & V IR TU A L E NV ’T 337 (2007)).
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F IG U R E 4
Saya—an A dvertising Model for the Japanese Computer
Graphics Company, Telyuka

Consider, for example, Saya, pictured in Figure 4. Saya is a school
girl who serves as a model in advertisements for a Japanese company
called “Telyuka.” 146 Telyuka is comprised of Japanese artists Teruyuki
Ishikawa and Yuka Ishikawa, who are 3D computer graphic artists
who design virtual humans, and Saya is actually a computer-generated
project that Telyuka started in 2015.147 Some who view Saya’s picture
or see Saya strolling with life-like motions across the screen on Telyuka’s animated website remark that, were it not for knowing the context of her depiction, Saya is nearly indistinguishable from a real
human, yet she evokes no eerie emotions whatsoever.148 For those
subjects, perhaps the uncanny valley has been crossed. Still, others
may sense an inexplicable nonhuman quality in her depiction, and
those subjects may recoil to some degree and, theoretically, descend
into the uncanny valley proportionately.149 R egardless of individual
opinion, we must agree that the computer graphic imaging and robotics design industries have developed significantly and rapidly, with research focused on circumventing (or perhaps, relying upon) the effect
of the uncanny valley in a way that facilitates effective interaction with
146. See T E LYU KA , https://www.telyuka.com/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/7YR H -3692]; see also Yvette Tan, Saya: B ig A m bitions for Japanese ‘D igital
D aughter,’ BBC (O ct. 8, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37548733
[https://perma.cc/PE 6A -VPBZ ].
147. See Tan, supra note 146.
148. See Juan Buis, T his G irl Isn’t R eal, and It’s Proof T hat CG I Isn’t Creepy A nym ore, N E XT W E B (Sept. 9, 2016), https://thenextweb.com/creativity/2016/09/09/cgigirl-isnt-real/ [https://perma.cc/8E WW-STP6].
149. See Kyoshiro Sasaki et al., A voidance of N ovelty Contributes to the Uncanny
V alley, F R O NTIE R S P SYCH O L . 9 (O ct 26, 2017), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/
10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01792/pdf [https://perma.cc/5XSZ -YMH L] (proposing that individual’s subjective impression of, and susceptibility to, uncanniness is part of the limitation to value it as a source of relevant or reliable empirical data).
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humans. In Saya’s case, her design is her function, which is to advertise the ability to design computer-animated virtual humans. Thus,
avoiding Mori’s uncanny valley is critical to her success. R esearch that
continues to test and refine Mori’s hypothesis, and the public’s reaction to it, will only further perfect our ability to successfully integrate
robotic entities into our lives by either relying on, crossing, or circumventing the uncanny valley. Specifically in the context of robotics design, Mori recommended that designers “take the first peak as their
goal, which results in a moderate degree of human likeness and a considerable sense of affinity.” 150 In fact, Mori predicted that “it is possible to create a safe level of affinity by deliberately pursuing a
nonhuman design.” 151 In the third article of this series, within the context of the reintegration of sexual offenders, I will demonstrate that
this observation by Mori will serve as a critical admonition to society
if sexual offenders are to avoid the uncanny valley and successfully
reintegrate into the community.
2. H uman–R obot Interaction
Studies applying the uncanny valley in robotics design typically focus on the manipulation of visual stimuli to assess a subject’s mere
affinity for specific categories or combinations of stimuli. Beyond the
mere aesthetic design of a robot, however, the field of social robotics
focuses on the study of the interaction between humans and robots.
D espite those who are skeptical of the relevance of the uncanny valley
to research in robotics design,152 within the study of human–robot interactions, many feel that “[t]here is enormous potential for psychologists to contribute to this strangely compelling field.” 153 This includes
Mori’s hypothesis of the uncanny valley.
In the context of human–robot interactions, Mori’s hypothesis is
quite relevant, whereas the specific research that scientists continue to
conduct is frequently based on it. O ften, the purpose of research
about human–robot interactions is simply that—to understand how
humans and robots interact. H owever, often, the purpose of conducting research that questions or applies Mori’s hypothesis is for a
variety of other, more specific purposes. For example, the application
of Mori’s theory may be relevant to contexts ranging from the treatment of child autism 154 to the adoption of culturally relevant educa150. Mori Translation, supra note 14, at 100.
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. See, e.g., Bartneck et al., supra note 123, at 275 (noting scarce empirical proof
for, and claiming weaknesses in, Mori’s hypothesis).
153. E lizabeth Broadbent, Interactions with R obots: T he T ruths W e R eveal A bout
O urselves, 68 A NN . R E V . P SYCH O L . 627, 646 (2017).
154. See Matthieu D estephe, et al., Uncanny V alley, R obot and A utism : Perception
of the Uncanniness In A n E m otional G ait, 2014 IE E E I NT ’L C O NF . R O BO TICS & B IO MIME TICS 1152, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282315397_U ncanny_val
ley_robot_and_autism_Perception_of_the_uncanniness_in_an_emotional_gait [https:/
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tional pedagogy,155 architectural theory,156 and even the use of lethal
autonomous weapons.157 Mori’s theory of the uncanny valley may be
applicable even to the study of society’s use of certain types of “sex
dolls,” as well as the use of sex dolls in the treatment of sexual offenders.158 Likewise, I assert that the uncanny valley may be relevant to
whether a sexually violent predator is released from civil commitment.
A ll of these are concepts that are being, or should be, studied, and
possibly shaped, by Mori’s hypothesis of the uncanny valley.
R ecall that the goal of many roboticists is to design the perfect android that is indistinguishable from a healthy human. In this endeavor,
although science has not yet perfected such a design, it has progressed
exponentially toward its goal in just a short time. Mori ultimately concluded, however, that the most effective robot design for appealing to
humans is not the one that is perfectly human but the one that is moderately human-like so as to be familiar to subjects, thereby maximizing
affinity, but sufficiently distinguishable such that subjects are not
psychically confused or aesthetically repulsed.159 Mori asserts that designing robots this way may minimize, or even avoid, the effect of the
uncanny valley.160 Likewise, it is the goal of most scientists in the field
of social robotics to study the social interactions between robots and
humans to create the most socially adept robot at interacting with
humans. To accomplish this, social roboticists also must avoid the uncanny valley.161

/perma.cc/5H NP-WYST]; Yuki U eyama, A B ayesian M odel of the Uncanny V alley
E ffect for E xplaining the E ffects of T herapeutic R obots in A utism Spectrum D isorder,
10 PLoS 2 (Sept. 21, 2015), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/
journal.pone.0138642&type=printable [https://perma.cc/TL7G -4XU G ]; Isabella
Jaramillo, D o A utistic Individuals E xperience the Uncanny V alley Phenom enon?: T he
R ole of T heory of M ind in H um an-R obot Interaction (2015) (unpublished Majors thesis, U niversity of Central Florida), http://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti
cle=1618&context=honorstheses1990-2015 [https://perma.cc/6YQ Y-A MJ8].
155. See R oberto O llivier-G arza, N eutraliz ing the Uncanny T hrough Culturally R elevant T eaching, 8 A R A B W O R LD E NG . J. 318 (2017); R oberto O llivier-G arza, Identifying the Uncanny Phenom ena in E ducational Practice, 7 A R A B W O R LD E NG . J. 175
(2016).
156. See Susan Piedmont-Palladino, Into the Uncanny V alley, P LA CE S J. (A pr.
2018), https://placesjournal.org/article/into-the-uncanny-valley/ [https://perma.cc/
F6TF-B6E U ].
157. See Chris Jenks, False R ubicons, M oral Panic, & Conceptual Cul-D e-Sacs: Critiquing & R efram ing the Call to B an L ethal A utonom ous W eapons, 44 P E PP . L. R E V .
1, 33 (2016).
158. See infra notes 214–26 and accompanying text; Mori Translation, supra note
14, at 100.
159. Mori Translation, supra note 14, at 100.
160. Id.
161. Sasaki et al., supra note 149, at 1. “[D ]eveloping a way to bridge this valley is
important if we want to have a future in which robots are properly integrated into our
society.” Id.
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O ne theory particularly relevant to avoiding the uncanny valley in
the social robotics area is “categorization difficulty.” 162 Put simply,
when the subject observing the stimuli experiences difficulty identifying into which of two categories an object belongs—“Is it a robot, or is
it a human?”—the observer becomes threatened by the object, creates
a negative impression, and avoids the object as a defense mechanism.163 Such was the basic format of Mori’s original study focused on
robot design.164 H owever, in the area of social robotics, Sasaki et al.
note that research focused on stimulus-related factors, such as Mori’s
research, is incomplete.165 Instead, scientists must also consider subject-related factors, such as individual personality traits of the subjects
observing the stimuli. Sasaki et al. contend that individual differences
in perceived eeriness, particularly by those with personality traits inclined to avoid novel experiences, have a steeper slope into the uncanny valley than subjects with personalities motivated by reward and
adventure-seeking.166 Persons who tend to avoid novelty perceive
unidentifiable objects with greater eeriness because of the need to create a new or novel category for the object.167
There are some studies that support the categorization difficulty
theory168 and some that do not.169 In creating stimuli, studies supporting the categorization difficulty theory presented objects that
morphed two “eerie-neutral” objects, such as a real human and a
child’s stuffed animal, whereas studies that opposed the theory
morphed one stimuli that was eerie and one that was eerie-neutral—
i.e., one of the morphed stimuli comprising the subject stimuli already
provoked negativity or avoidance.170 A lthough both groups of studies
concluded that categorization is not a unitary factor in promoting the
uncanny valley,171 variation in morphing manipulation may be a rele162. See id.
163. See id. at 2; see also Wang et al., supra note 15, at 393.
164. Mori Translation, supra note 14, at 98.
165. Sasaki et al., supra note 149, at 2.
166. O f course, generally, society does not “seek adventure” with respect to the
safety of children in the sexual offense context. H owever, this A rticle nevertheless
demonstrates the potential analogy of categorization difficulty in the context of sexual
offenders.
167. Id. at 9.
168. See Ferrey et al., supra note 136; Yamada et al., supra note 136.
169. See, e.g., Tyler J. Burleigh & Jordan R . Schoenherr, A R eappraisal of the Uncanny V alley: Categorical Perception or Frequency-B ased Sensitiz ation?, 6 F R O NTIE R
P SYCH O L . 1488 (2015); Marcus Cheetham et al., Perceptual D iscrim ination D ifficulty
and Fam iliarity in the Uncanny V alley: M ore L ik e a “H appy V alley”, 5 F R O NTIE R
P SYCH O L . 1219 (2014); Karl F. MacD orman & D ebeleena Chattopadhyay, R educing
Consistency in H um an R ealism Increases the Uncanny V alley E ffect; Increasing Category Uncertainty D oes N ot, 146 C O G NITIO N 190 (2016).
170. Sasaki et al., supra note 149, at 10.
171. Id. at 9 (concluding that, based on a comprehensive analysis of numerous studies, the uncanny valley effect is the result of the interaction of neurophysiological,
cognitive, and social factors that are finally integrated as a conscious perception of
eeriness).
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vant distinction, particularly when the subjects’ personality traits are
considered.172 Some researchers caution that in studying the application of the uncanny valley hypothesis, researchers should not design
stimuli scales that include inherently negative or revolting stimuli,
such as corpses or zombies, because they are predetermined to be
connotatively negative.173 A s I will describe in the second article of
this series, this factor is particularly relevant when applying the uncanny valley hypothesis to the context of sexual offenders because the
public has a predetermined negative perception of sexual offenders as
inhuman monsters.174
R elevant to this is another factor that may affect conclusions about
categorization difficulty—the unconscious emotional processing pathways of individual subjects.175 This variable may play a similar role of
producing uncanny valley effects when incidental learning is considered. For example, “[t]he uncanny valley is an everyday phenomenon
that occurs regardless of any explicit cognitive task[,] . . . [and]
[i]ncidental learning is knowledge acquisition that occurs without intention. It is likely that incidental categorization also produces the uncanny valley for objects that are hard to categorize.” 176 O ne study
tested this concept by morphing together two visual depictions of different kinds of fruit (for example, a strawberry and a tomato) and
subliminally providing corresponding olfactory stimuli to determine
the effect on the subject’s preference for the fruits. This study concluded that “subliminally presented odors mitigate negative impressions of hard-to-categorize foods . . . .” 177 H ypothetically, therefore,
emotional pathways may be incidentally influenced by other emotional and knowledge-based stimuli. I propose that this is a significant
factor in the public’s perception of sexual offenders, particularly with
172. Id. at 10. Interestingly, at least one study revealed that morphed images of
mixed genders did not provoke a negative response, making it less likely that perceived differences in sex influenced outcomes. See Yamada et al., supra note 136, at
10. H owever, in the context of sex offenders, the perception and legal treatment of
female offenders contrasts starkly with that of male offenders. See F LA NNE R Y &
O ’B R IE N , supra note 4, at 23–39.
173. See K ätsyri et al., supra note 14, at 11–12.
174. Michael T. Flannery, T he Uncanny V alley and the V erisim ilitude of Sexual O ffenders— Part II: Perception V ersus R eality (forthcoming 2020).
175. Sasaki et al., supra note 149, at 10.
176. Id.
177. See Yuki Yamada et al., Scents B oost Preference for N ovel Fruits, 81 A PPE TITE
102 (2014). See also Christopher C. Berger et al., T he Uncanny V alley of H aptics, SCI .
R O BO TICS 1 (A pr. 18, 2018), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Christopher_Berger
/publication/324597127_The_uncanny_valley_of_haptics/links/5ad78ccb0f7e9b28593
ac4dc/The-uncanny-valley-of-haptics.pdf?origin=publication_detail [https://perma.cc/
CH H 3-FU 2M] (finding an uncanny valley exists for subjects who interact with robots
when the subject’s perception of forces (i.e., tactile sensations) rendered during
human–robot interactions or virtual reality manipulations are incongruent with other
sensory cues, thereby concluding that enhancements of the interactive forces with robots do not necessarily lead to an improved subjective experience by the human
operator).
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respect to how the media influences the public’s perspective of sexual
offenders. This is because the media is so often the originating source
of the public’s incidental knowledge of sexual offenders.178
A lso related to categorization difficulty is the theory of “perception
mismatch” or “realism inconsistency,” which is supported in many
studies.179 Perception mismatch occurs when one perceives conflicted
cues that violate expectations, such as when a robot looks just like a
human but acts clearly robotically.180 Saygin et al. tested the uncanny
valley theory by showing subjects three video clips: an android (appearing human-like but acting robotically); a human (appearing
human and acting humanly); and a robot (appearing mechanical and
acting mechanically).181 The study showed greater brain activity and
neural processing in the subjects when observed behavior was mismatched with expectations.182 The study concluded that people expect
humans to act like humans, so if people observe an android that they
perceive to be human but that acts in nonhuman ways, it violates people’s expectations for humans and sends negative feedback to the
brain.183
A lthough there are a variety of other theories that may explain
Mori’s hypothesis of the uncanny valley,184 “categorization difficulty”
and “perception mismatch” are the two theories that appear to be
most effectual in the context of robot design and social robotics. The
study of Mori’s hypothesis in these areas has led to advances in areas
not necessarily concerned with robotics per se, but areas for which
robots merely function as tools to accomplish a specific purpose, such
as in the area of healthcare robots designed to assist the elderly with
specific daily functions.185 In terms of robot design in such areas,
178. I discuss this concept in greater detail in the second article of this series.
179. See, e.g., K ätsyri et al., supra note 14, at 6–7; MacD orman & Chattopadhyay,
supra note 169; MacD orman et al., supra note 133; Jun’ichiro Seyama & R uth S.
Nagayama, T he Uncanny V alley: E ffect of R ealism on the Im pression of A rtificial
H um an Faces, 16 P R E SE NCE 337 (2007); Wade J. Mitchell et al., A M ism atch in the
H um an R ealism of Face and V oice Produces an Uncanny V alley, 2 I MPE R CE PTIO N 10
(2011).
180. Broadbent, supra note 153, at 627.
181. Saygin et al., supra note 135, at 415.
182. Id. at 420.
183. Broadbent, supra note 153, at 638 (citing MacD orman & Chattopadhyay,
supra note 169).
184. See Wang et al., supra note 15, at 394–98 (describing Pathogen A voidance hypothesis, Mortality Salience hypothesis, E volutionary A esthetics hypothesis, Violation of E xpectation hypothesis, Categorical U ncertainty hypothesis, and Mind
Perception hypothesis); see also K ätsyri et al., supra note 14, at 4–7 (describing Naı̈ve
hypothesis, Morbidity hypothesis, Movement hypothesis, Categorization A mbiguity
hypothesis, and Perceptual Mismatch hypothesis).
185. See Broadbent, supra note 153, at 629 (offering examples, like physical tasks
(e.g., picking up or carrying objects), cognitive activities (e.g., remembering to take
medication or bathe), health management (e.g., monitoring vital signs or alerting authorities to falls or other emergencies), and psychosocial issues (e.g., providing comfort or companionship)).
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Mori’s advice to design a robot that is clearly distinguishable from
humans is applicable, since a robot does not need to be indistinguishable from a human to accomplish the objective for which it is designed
to function. Likewise, in terms of social robotics, although still quite
experimental, researchers are studying Mori’s theory to learn how to
program robots to interact with children with autism, who tend to
have difficulty socializing with other humans, particularly in interpreting emotions. In this example, a humanoid robot that is not overly
human-like may be programmed to be more simplistic and predictable
in its limited behaviors and emotional responses, from which the autistic child may observe social cues and then assimilate those learned
behaviors in his or her interactions with other people.186 Thus, Mori’s
theory is useful in studying not only how humans respond to how robots look (robot design) but also how humans interact with robots
based on how the robots are designed to function.
O ne theory that expands upon Mori’s hypothesis based on the functionality of robots rather than the robots’ physical likeness to humans,
and which proposes that Mori’s uncanny valley may be circumvented
altogether, is the theory of ethorobotics. In the following Section, I
explain the relevance and applicability of ethorobotics to robotic design and social robotics generally, and to Mori’s approach to the uncanny valley specifically. Notwithstanding the relevance and
applicability of ethorobotics to Mori’s uncanny valley hypothesis with
respect to the development of social robots, the third article of this
series will question its effectiveness in avoiding the uncanny valley altogether when applied to the release and reintegration of civilly committed sexually violent predators.
C. E xpanding M ori’s H ypothesis: E thorobotics
Miklósi et al. proposed a new approach for solving the paradox of
the uncanny valley within the field of human–robot relations.187 The
approach is premised on Mori’s hypothesis, but it relies on evolutionary, ecological, and ethological principles of human behavior and focuses on optimizing the functionality of robots within a defined
“niche.” 188 The approach is called “ethorobotics,” and it addresses
some of the problems associated with the categorization difficulty inherent in Mori’s hypothesis. Miklósi et al. proposed that, within any
ecology, “biological agents should be able to discriminate others at
three different levels: (1) conspecifics (same species) versus heterospecifics (other species, e.g., predators); (2) familiar conspecifics (e.g.,
186. See D estephe et al., supra note 154; U eyama, supra note 154, at 1; Jaramillo,
supra note 154.
187. See Á d ám Miklósi et al., E thorobotics: A N ew A pproach to H um an-R obot R elationship, F R O NTIE R S P SYCH O L . (June 9, 2017), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/
10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00958/pdf [https://perma.cc/VB56-47D 9].
188. Id. at 1.
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group members) versus unfamiliar conspecifics (e.g., strangers/intruders); [and] (3) familiar conspecifics versus individuals (e.g., mate,
friends, and pups).” 189 E ach level of discrimination occurs within a
“peak” on the diagram of the uncanny valley, which, for ethorobotics,
is plotted with three peaks, as presented in Figure 5.190
F IG U R E 5
Ethorobotic Illustration of the U ncanny Valley

In the diagram in Figure 5, the first or medium peak is essentially
the same as that of Mori’s hypothesis for robots progressing in human
likeness. The subject here is distinguishing robots, androids, and
humans by degree of human likeness until the point at which the humanoid robots become too similar to humans and fall into the first
uncanny valley. Likewise, as with Mori’s hypothesis, the ethorobotic
diagram presents robots as eventually moving through the uncanny
valley as they develop into perfect representations of human beings.
H owever, the ethorobotic approach contemplates that robots will
quickly surpass or transcend human capacity and become what researchers refer to as “trans-humans.” 191 Note that the horizontal axis
represented on the ethorobotic uncanny valley diagram represents not
only human likeness but also the passage of time in the development
of robotic technology. Thus, it represents that the time it takes a robot
to transcend the second peak of perfect human likeness is of short
189. Id. at 2.
190. Id. Figure 5 is presented in Miklósi et al., which credits Jamais Cascio. See id.
at 4 fig.2; see also James Cascio, T he Second Uncanny V alley, O PE N F U TU R E (O ct. 27,
2007), http://www.openthefuture.com/2007/10/the_second_uncanny_valley.html
[https://perma.cc/2Q FU -Z 6SW].
191. Miklósi et al., supra note 187, at 4.
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duration. This is because, technologically, once a robot becomes indistinguishable from humans, it will not be long before it transcends the
peak of human performance and begins, once again, to distinguish itself from humans by surpassing human capacity. A s in so many mainstream movies in which robots interact in society and quickly become
so technologically advanced that they “take over” the human protagonists,192 it becomes our fear that, as these perfected human-like androids transcend human capacity, they once again will become either
difficult to categorize or will more egregiously diverge from our expectations for humans. Thus, as they transcend humans, they consequently fall into a second uncanny valley. The diagram then ascends to
a third peak as the technology that has now transcended human capacity continues to develop. A ccordingly, as the transcendent robot
continues to surpass human capacity, it increasingly distinguishes itself
from being perceived and categorized as human. A s stated in Miklósi
et al., “[t]he hill after the valley is when differentiation is strong
enough to create a new category.” 193 Thus, the third hill comprises a
new category of “post-human” robots, which will not again approach
the maximum humanness that it has already surpassed. Instead, as its
technology continues to advance, humans will “have problems in predicting the behavior of robots that look like us but behave differently.” 194 A s a result, the post-human robot will only descend again
into further negative familiarity, mirroring its opposite ascent toward
human likeness before it fell into the first uncanny valley.
Miklósi et al. propose that advanced robots may entirely circumvent
the two uncanny valleys between the three peaks if they are perceived
not in terms of human likeness but in terms of functionality within the
environment in which they have developed. For example, “[i]nstead of
aiming to build more and more human-like robots and trying to
‘climb’ the Maximum Peak, we may start robot construction by determining their function and their environment and design the m[o]st
suited agent independently from its similarity to humans.” 195 Because—unlike humans—robots are not constrained by evolutionary
continuity, we may design robots to “ ‘jump’ from one type of agent to
a radically different one” without having to embody perfect humanness, thus allowing it to integrate into the human environment in a
socially competent way based on its ethological functionality, without
descending into the uncanny valley. A 3D “ethorobotic” version of
advancing human–robot interaction is presented in Figure 6.196

192. See, e.g., T H E T E R MINA TO R (O rion Pictures 1984); T H E M A TR IX (Warner
Brothers 1999); U NCA NNY (R LJ E ntertainment 2015).
193. Miklósi et al., supra note 187, at 4 fig.2.
194. Id. at 4 (citing Saygin et al., supra note 135).
195. Miklósi et al., supra note 187, at 4.
196. Id. at 5 fig.3.
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F IG U R E 6
3D Ethorobotic Illustration of the U ncanny Valley for
A dvancing Robot Interaction

Premised on Mori’s hypothesis, Miklósi et al. describe this threedimensional ethorobotic concept, illustrated in Figure 6, as follows:
A fter the peak and the second uncanny valley, robots are likely to
evolve into a diversity of morphologies and behaviors that, depending on their functions, gradually move away from perfect human
likeness. The wide curved arrow indicates the possible detour for
social robotics by moving directly from the present state to less
humanlike robots with diverse functionality retaining high-level capacity for social interaction with humans. The labels on the terrain
are only for informative purposes and do not necessarily refer to
actual existing robots.197

Thus, an ethological approach to effectively integrating robots into
society is accomplished by designing and perceiving robots not in relation to their human likeness but rather in relation to their social competence and functionality within the environment into which they are
integrated. Miklósi et al. offer the evolution and domestication of the
dog as an analogous form of social integration that successfully circumvents the uncanny valley. D espite the dog’s morphological and
behavioral differences, the dog has demonstrated complex, humanlike social competencies that maximize its functionality within society.198 “Social competence” is defined as:
197. Id.
198. Id. at 5.
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[A ]n individual’s ability to generate social skills that conform to the
expectations of others and the social rules of the group . . . . Such
complex level of interaction emerges if the individual wants to participate, has the means to participate, and is regarded by others as
being able to participate in the life of the group.199

Important to the complexity of the interaction, at least from the
human perspective, is that “humans can maintain control over
ethorobots by controlling the nature of the interaction, and whether
they maintain or close down the actual niche of the robot.” 200 A ssuming the viability of this assertion, Miklósi et al. conclude that the solution lies in categorizing social robots separately from humans, thereby
removing the constraints of human expectations and circumventing
the uncanny valley.
This ethorobotic expansion of Mori’s uncanny valley hypothesis offers a viable—or at least, testable—option for designing and recategorizing robots to maximize their functionality and, at the same time,
to optimize their human likeness to suit their function and the environment in which they will interact with humans. With respect to
human–robot interactions, there are sound benefits to such an approach. Consider, for example, a context in which human–robot interaction occurs, for which perfecting human likeness in the robot is
essential, and within which simply avoiding the uncanny valley by not
even approaching it (by pursuing a nonhuman design, as Mori proposed) is insufficient. This was the case involving the design of a computer-animated virtual avatar of a ten-year-old Filipina girl named
“Sweetie”—pictured in Figure 7.
F IG U R E 7
Computer-A nimated Virtual A vatar, “Sweetie”

199. Id. at 5–6 (citations omitted).
200. Id. at 6.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-3\TWL305.txt

586

unknown

Seq: 46

T E X A S A &M L A W R E V IE W

13-MA Y-19

14:24

[Vol. 6

In 2013, a D utch children’s rights group called Terre des H ommes,
which sought to expose “webcam child sex tourism,” 201 contracted a
computer animation company to design a human-like computeranimated child to be used in a sting operation targeting online sexual
predators.202 O fficials posted a depiction of “Sweetie” online to lure
predators into open webcam connections, during which programmers
would use motion capture to animate Sweetie as necessary to interact
with the predators. A fter engaging in some dialogue, the predator
would wire-transfer $20 and provide a Skype address to continue a
sexual exchange online.203 U pon obtaining this identifying information, officials exited the chat room and provided the predator’s identifying information to Interpol. In just ten weeks of operation—during
which, at any one time, more than 750,000 child sexual predators were
actively engaged in more than 40,000 online chat rooms, in only
nineteen of which Sweetie posted her identity—more than 20,000 persons contacted Sweetie. Through this exercise, law enforcement was
able to identify over 1,000 predators from seventy-one countries.204
Sweetie’s sting operation became “the largest sexual abuse case in
history.” 205
There is no way to know, of course, but one wonders to what extent
the uncanny valley effect influenced the outcome in the case. D id
Sweetie successfully cross the uncanny valley? O bviously, she did for
over 1,000 sexual offenders. O f course, while there may have been
countless reasons why 19,000 others did not pursue Sweetie as a viable
option for sexual contact, it stands to reason that some of the 19,000
who initially contacted Sweetie were unsettled by her appearance and
relegated her to the uncanny valley. O ne of the criticisms of Mori’s
theory is that the sense of the uncanny is subjective and, therefore,
201. The group defines “webcam child sex tourism” as “when adults pay to direct
and view live-streaming video footage of children in another country performing sexual acts in front of a webcam.” Mark Memmott, V irtual ‘Sweetie’ Uncovered 1,000
Sexual Predators, G roup Says, NPR (Nov. 5, 2013, 2:20 PM), https://www.npr.org/sec
tions/thetwo-way/2013/11/05/243245567/virtual-sweetie-uncovered-1-000-sexual-preda
tors-group-says [https://perma.cc/Y9YT-L4PZ ].
202. Id.
203. See Lia G rainger, O peration ‘Sweetie’: H ow a V irtual G irl B rought a R eal-L ife
A ustralian Sex O ffender to Justice, R E A D E R ’S D IG . A SIA P A CIFIC (A ug. 1, 2017),
https://www.liagrainger.com/#/sweetie/ [https://perma.cc/K4U N-XM8G ?type=image]
(describing the process by which Terre des H ommes created the sting operation and
designed “Sweetie,” and an account of the sting of one of the predators from A ustralia who contacted Sweetie).
204. Id. O f the 1,000 predators who were identified, only one was female; 254 were
from the U nited States; 110 were from the U nited Kingdom; 103 were from India;
fifty-four were from Canada; forty-six were from A ustralia; and forty-four were from
G ermany. Id.; see also Lauren Walker, Com puter-G enerated 10-Y ear-O ld G irl L eads
to Conviction of O nline Predator, N E WSWE E K (O ct. 21, 2014, 1:27 PM), https://www.
newsweek.com/computer-generated-10-year-old-girl-leads-conviction-online-preda
tor-278811 [https://perma.cc/8B2Q -TW6M].
205. See G rainger, supra note 203.
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cannot be validated empirically.206 But even assuming the uncanny
valley effect deterred all 19,000 predators who discontinued their exchange with Sweetie, in the case of identifying child predators, is it
sufficient that Sweetie falls into the uncanny valley 95% of the time?
Some researchers studying the uncanny valley effect on human–robot
interactions might say, “Yes” because the goal should not be to create
robots that are indistinguishable from humans; rather, the goal should
be to create human-like robots that function to accommodate a projected niche,207 which Sweetie obviously did 1,000 times. Therefore,
the question researchers may have to decide is whether to continue to
strive to improve upon Sweetie’s human-like qualities so as to cross
the uncanny valley with greater percentage, or to configure Sweetie to
optimize her functionality in the desired niche of tracking online child
sexual predators.208
The answer to this dilemma depends on which approach to the uncanny valley one takes. O bviously, Mori’s conclusion to avoid the uncanny valley by designing a robot that is clearly distinguishable from a
human is ineffectual, whereas unless Sweetie appears to be indistinguishable from a human, she serves no function within the niche for
identifying online sexual predators. It is possible, if not likely, that this
was the case for at least some of the 19,000 sexual predators whose
subjective response to Sweetie’s uncanny human likeness left her descended into the uncanny valley. Theoretically, according to Mori’s
hypothesis, the only way to maximize Sweetie’s function as a resource
for identifying online sexual predators is to continue to develop
Sweetie’s technology by perfecting her human likeness, which is either
limited technologically or necessarily subject to the effect of the uncanny valley for any length of time, which could be cost-prohibitive
and, nevertheless, progressively ineffective.
U nder an ethorobotic approach, however, instead of aiming to increase Sweetie’s capacity by perfecting her human likeness and ascending the “Maximum Peak,” designers may first identify Sweetie’s
projected function and her environment, and then design her in a way
that maximizes her function independently from her similarity to
humans. Free from the constraints of the evolutionary biology of
human agents, “robot engineering can proceed by ‘jumps’ from one
type of agent to a radically different one” without having to embody
perfect humanness.209 D esign based on ethological functionality al206. See G uizzo, supra note 104; Sofge, supra note 104; Wang et al., supra note 15,
at 393, 403.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 186–87 (quoting Miklósi et al., supra note
187, at 1) (alteration in original).
208. Since 2013, Sweetie’s designers have developed her into an automated
chatbot, named “Sweetie 2.0,” that can chat simultaneously in numerous chat rooms
and that “warns and deters (potential) offenders of webcam sex with children.”
G rainger, supra note 203.
209. Miklósi et al., supra note 187, at 4–5.
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lows Sweetie to integrate into the human environment in a socially
competent way without descending into the uncanny valley. Thus,
under an ethorobotic approach, through which the designer may control the interactions between Sweetie and the online predators, designers may terminate Sweetie’s function within the niche without
pursuing a perfected human-like version of her that must pass through
the uncanny valley. Instead, designers may optimize her function by
redesigning her as a “trans-human” robot, which surpasses a human’s
capacity for identifying online predators in chat rooms. In fact, this is
precisely what occurred with Sweetie. Since the success of her tenure
as an online computer-animated avatar, Sweetie’s designers have developed her into an automated chatbot 210 named “Sweetie 2.0,” which
now functions measurably differently than the original avatar,
Sweetie. “Sweetie 2.0” can now chat simultaneously in numerous chat
rooms and “warns and deters (potential) offenders of webcam sex
with children.” 211 While not radically different in terms of its purpose
and environment, its functionality is optimized by designing the agent
independently from its physical likeness to humans and transcending a
human’s capacity to animate an avatar’s interactions with predators
one chat room at a time, thus allowing it to integrate into the human
environment in a socially competent way based on its ethological
functionality. Thus, whereas Sweetie might appear on Mori’s diagram
as mired in the uncanny valley 95% of the time, on the ethorobotic
diagram, “Sweetie” would plot atop the first peak as a computer-generated avatar and would “jump” to the third peak as “Sweetie 2.0,”
plotting as a trans-human chatbot and, thereby, circumventing the uncanny valleys altogether.
Because the focus is on functionality rather than human likeness, an
ethorobotic approach avoids that point of robot development in
Mori’s diagram at which the ability to categorize and socially recognize distinctions in human likeness becomes problematic. In discussing
categorization difficulty and the importance of social recognition, specifically for infants, Miklósi et al. assert that Mori’s hypothesis provides for limited options for developing social robots that avoid the
uncanny valley.
[The] natural process of emerging social recognition in humans suggests that only by massively exposing babies to (future) social robots can we avoid that they “fall in the uncanny valley.” Such forced
exposure seems unrealistic and would be also unethical, moreover,

210. A “chatbot” is defined as “a computer program designed to have a conversation with a human being, especially over the internet.” Chatbot, C A MBR ID G E D ICTIO NA R Y , https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/chatbot (last visited
Sept. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/A 5YP-WH 99].
211. G rainger, supra note 203.
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it could also confuse the social recognition system of humans, and
lead to misguided social and sexual preferences.212

Conversely, Miklósi et al. contend that one of the advantages of
ethorobotics is that it avoids the “possible dangers that may emerge if
the present trend of technical development continues.” 213 This would
include the “misguided social and sexual preferences” that arguably
may result from over-exposure to social robots. Yet, on the terrain of
the ethorobotic concept of emerging human–robot interaction (Figure
6), Miklósi et al. nevertheless include “sex robot” as a category of
functional interaction between robots and humans. A lthough, to
many, the use of sex robots and sex dolls may be “creepy” or “uncanny”—perhaps even socially or morally objectionable—it is not illegal in most places,214 and some advocate the practice as a healthy
form of sexual expression.215 With the sex toy industry projected as a
nearly-$30 billion a year industry by 2020,216 we can be sure that one
of the primary goals of the industry is to avoid the uncanny valley in
the area of sex robots and sex dolls.
212. Miklósi et al., supra note 187, at 3; see also D avid Levy, “Falling in L ove W ith
a Com panion,” in 8 C LO SE E NG A G E ME NTS W ITH A R TIFICIA L C O MPA NIO NS: K E Y SO CIA L , P SYCH O LO G ICA L , E TH ICA L A ND D E SIG N I SSU E S 89–90 (Yorick Wilks ed., 2010).
213. Miklósi et al., supra note 187, at 6.
214. Child sex dolls have been banned in A ustralia and the U .K. See A ndrew
Blake, H ouse Passes B ill T argeting Child Sex R obots, W A SH . T IME S (June 14, 2018),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jun/14/house-passes-bill-targeting-childsex-robots/ [https://perma.cc/8Q YB-R 4Q 7]. O n D ecember 14, 2017, H ouse R epresentative D aniel M. D onovan, Jr. introduced a new bill to Congress designed to “prohibit
the importation or transportation of child sex dolls . . . .” H .R . 4655, 115th Cong.
(2018). The bill is called the “Curbing R ealistic E xploitative E lectronic Pedophile R obots A ct of 2017” (the “CR E E PE R A ct of 2017”). The H ouse passed the bill in 2018.
See 164 C O NG . R E C . H 5119–H 5121 (daily ed. June 13, 2018). The bill only applies to
the importation and distribution of specific forms of dolls, however; possessing or
using such dolls is not prohibited. See, e.g., N o Porn Charge for M an W ho O rdered
Child Sex D olls, U .S. N E WS (O ct. 4, 2018, 4:29 A M), https://www.usnews.com/news/
best-states/kentucky/articles/2018-10-04/no-porn-charge-for-kentucky-man-who-ordered-child-sex-dolls [https://perma.cc/3NPP-Z G 64] (reporting on Kentucky case of
Scott L. Phillips, who, after ordering child sex dolls resembling an infant and a six- to
eight-year-old child, was charged with having an item portraying a sexual performance by a minor, but for whom the court dismissed the charges because there was no
actual child involved). Some states are considering specific legislation prohibiting
other conduct involving child sex dolls. See, e.g., R yan Nicol, L auren B ook Files State
B an of ‘O bscene, Child-L ik e’ Sex D olls, F LA . P O L . (D ec. 17, 2018), https://floridapolitics.com/archives/283624-book-bill-sex-dolls [https://perma.cc/65BB-WLQ 7] (describing Florida SB 160, which prohibits the possession of an obscene, child-like sex doll
with the intent of selling, distributing, or showing the doll, or advertising the doll in
any manner).
215. See, e.g., D avid Knox et al., Sex D olls – Creepy or H ealthy?: A ttitudes of Undergraduates, 3 J. P O SITIVE SE XU A LITY 32, 37 (2017) (suggesting that using sex dolls
“is not creepy but healthy sexuality”).
216. G lobal A dult T oys M ark et to E xceed USD 29 B illion by 2020, A ccording to
T echnavio, B U S. W IR E (A pr. 12, 2016, 3:20 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20160412005747/en/G lobal-A dult-Toys-Market-E xceed-U SD -29 [https://
perma.cc/SLL8-A 2X9].

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-3\TWL305.txt

590

unknown

Seq: 50

T E X A S A &M L A W R E V IE W

13-MA Y-19

14:24

[Vol. 6

Note that on the ethorobotic scale in Figure 6, sex robots plot just
over the peak of the first hill, at the beginning of the steep downward
slope of the first uncanny valley. Plotted on Mori’s scale, sex robots
most likely would plot at approximately the same point—at or near
the top or downslope of the first peak.217 O n Mori’s scale, as sex robots continue to develop technologically and become even more
human-like, they begin a descent into the uncanny valley, resulting
from the typical categorization and perception factors that account for
so many uncanny valley descents in robotics. H owever, some researchers believe that an additional consequence of perfecting the development of sex-robot design—perhaps by employing it with
artificial intelligence that is cognitive, responsive, and even emotive—
is the deterioration of healthy and intimate human relationships218
and the increase of “misguided social and sexual preferences” that
Miklósi et al. caution against.219 Miklósi et al. assert, instead, that an
ethorobotic approach avoids this effect of the uncanny valley.
Consider that the sex robot’s function is to replace or supplement
the intimacy and sexuality of the traditional human sexual relationship. Thus, as in the case of Sweetie, once again we confront a context
in which the functionality of the robot is dependent upon maximizing
its human likeness. Taken to its extreme in terms of technological development, the controversial issue that arises is the acceptability, or
integration into society, of sex robots of which the perfected human
likeness is that of a child.220 In such an inherently disturbing and un217. Sex robots are plotted on the downslope of the first peak on Mori’s scale because of their advanced life-like technological development and the capacity for artificial intelligence. See Noel Sharkey et al., O ur Sexual Future W ith R obots: A
Foundation for R esponsible R obotics Consultation R eport, F O U ND . F O R R E SPO NSIBLE
R O BO TICS 10 (2017), https://responsible-robotics-myxf6pn3xr.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/FR R -Consultation-R eport-O ur-Sexual-Future-with-robots-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/A WM9-A D NS] (describing how life-like sex dolls can be).
218. R esearch suggests that an overall societal movement “inward,” with less traditional social interaction, coordinates with the development of social technologies.
H owever, the data also shows a concomitant increase in loneliness, depression, and
suicide rate. A s a result of new technologies, the familiar traditional relationship is
being replaced by opportunities for detached relationships with strangers in distant
places, without physical contact, and without normative behaviors for interacting. The
result is a feeling of being outcast from society that clings to traditional norms premised on social integration and, consequently, a sense of cognitive dissonance. Likewise, the prevalence of the use of sex robots as a form of intimate relationship to
replace traditional sexual relationships anticipates a decrease in the desire for intimacy or sexuality with other humans. H owever, research conducted at the U niversity
of Montreal evidenced differential sexual outcomes from which researchers could not
conclusively determine if such intimate relationships were harmful or beneficial. Colin
Wright, Sex D olls, L E T ’S K NO W T H ING S (D ec. 12, 2017), http://letsknowthings.com/
author/colin/ [https://perma.cc/YA 9J-CLCC].
219. See Sharkey et al., supra note 217, at 20–22 (describing unnatural relationships
and effect on human sexual relationships).
220. The production and distribution of child-like sex robots and sex dolls has become a global industry. “The ultimate goal of manufacturers is to make the child sex
dolls look and feel as realistic as possible.” Marie-H elen Maras & Lauren R . Shapiro,
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natural context, which is uncomfortable even to conceptualize, this is
not a function society wishes to optimize under an ethorobotic approach to developing robotic technology. Nor is this an uncanny valley
that society should determine to circumvent. Indeed, there are those
who assert that child sex robots should be used in the treatment of
sexual pedophiles to satisfy or channel the otherwise uncontrollable
impulse of the pedophile to offend against a real child.221 Should
“child sex dolls for the treatment of pedophilia” plot on the third plateau as a “trans-human” category of human–robot interaction that optimizes its function on the ethorobotic scale? What if, like “Sweetie
2.0,” the child sex robot “jumped” to the third peak on the
ethorobotic scale and avoided the uncanny valley by adopting a design
that presented merely human features but was clearly distinguishable
from a real child, yet still optimized its function as a sex robot that was
simply labeled as a child? Should we not rely on Mori’s uncanny valley
to isolate the socially unacceptable behaviors that violate normative
human or societal expectations? Will our normative expectations
change as we study the actual effect of child sex robots as a function of
the treatment of pedophilia?—or the protection of women and children in the prostitution industry?—or the reduction of human trafficking?—or the quelling of the rapist’s urge to rape? 222—H ow much
“creepiness” will society tolerate if it serves a greater function? 223
‘Shadow’ T rade in Child Sex D olls Should be B anned, Say Profs, C R IME R E P . (Jan. 24,
2018), https://thecrimereport.org/2018/01/24/the-growing-danger-of-child-sex-dolls/
[https://perma.cc/25V3-3TXC].
221. See R oc Morin, Can Child D olls K eep Pedophiles from O ffending?, A TLA NTIC
(Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/01/can-child-dollskeep-pedophiles-from-offending/423324/ [https://perma.cc/G D 7L-4R YX] (interviewing Shin Takagi, self-admitted pedophile and founder of a company called Trottla,
which manufactures and sells anatomically correct, life-like child sex dolls). Takagi
believes his dolls serve as a source of harm-reduction in the treatment of pedophilia.
Id. H owever, Peter Fagan, a paraphilia researcher at John H opkins School of
Medicine, believes that “contact with Trottla’s products would likely have a ‘reinforcing effect’ on pedophilic ideation and ‘in many instances, cause it to be acted upon
with greater urgency.’” Id.
222. O ne company, True Companion, produces a sex robot with programmable
personalities, one of which is called “Frigid Farrah,” which is designed to reject and
resist all sexual advances, thus “encouraging the user to rape the robot.” Maras &
Shapiro, supra note 220; see also Laura Bates, T he T rouble with Sex R obots, N.Y.
T IME S (July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/opinion/sex-robots-consent.html [https://perma.cc/3322-WNSL] (offering the opinion that making sex robots
available “is to risk normalizing rape by giving it a publicly acceptable face”); Beth
Timmins, N ew Sex R obots W ith ‘Frigid’ Setting A llow M en to Sim ulate R ape, I ND E PE ND E NT (July 18, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/sex-robots-frigidsettings-rape-simulation-men-sexual-assault-a7847296.html [https://perma.cc/X62FJ23B].
223. In an interview in 2016, Takagi was asked about his view of the nature of the
sex dolls and their emotional status. The interview exchange was replete with anthropomorphic references and overtones of “uncanniness”:
“D oes she have a nam e?” I asked gesturing towards the nearest doll—a
model he later described as a 10-to-12-year-old.
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In the context of sex robots and child sex dolls, Mori’s diagram of
the uncanny valley serves positively to deter such behaviors that society may deem unacceptable. Likewise, the ethorobotic approach to
the technological development of sex robots may serve equally to prohibit socially unacceptable behaviors like the use of child sex dolls. A s
was the case in the context of Sweetie, under an ethorobotic approach,
the designer has the power to regulate the functional interactions of
the sex robot within the human environment. Thus, if, in the course of
optimizing the functionality of the sex robot, its need for human likeness forces it unavoidably into the uncanny valley—such as in the context of child sex robots—the designer can simply remove it from its
functional niche in the human environment. This may occur within an
ethorobotic approach—as well as within Mori’s approach—through
industry restraint,224 social regulation,225 or legal prohibition.226 A l“There is no name,” he said, “just a code name—LP1.”
“W hat em otions do you see in her face?” I asked.
“T his one look s lik e she’s sad,” he said. “O ne must make a variety of expressions to fulfill a variety of client needs.”
In Japan, where many have animist Shinto beliefs, the dolls have a com plicated status. “In Shinto,” Takagi said, “everything has a soul. E ven if you
don’t want the dolls anymore, you can’t abandon them . There is a special
ceremony that is performed for them at a shrine. It’s like a cerem ony for a
dead person. Since dolls have a hum an form , they m ust be treated as such.”
H e described a recent case in which a client who needed to get rid of a doll
called, requesting his help. “H e wanted me to dispose of it,” Takagi
remembered. “But, he didn’t say ‘dispose.’ T he phrase he used was ‘send
back hom e.’”
A t the end of our interview, as I was photographing a set of fiberglass molds,
I noticed Takagi and my translator speaking in a corner.
“What were you talking about?” I asked her later.
“My husband died in a motorcycle crash several years ago,” she said. “I was
asking Mr. Takagi how m uch it would cost to m ak e a replica of him .”
We all walked out together, the same way we came in—passing a pile of
discarded fiberglass skeletons waiting to be removed. These were the remains of some of the dolls that had been sent “back hom e.” “They’re toxic,”
Takagi explained. “So, we need a special company to come and pick them
up. They have to be crushed with hammers. E verything with form m ust be
brok en eventually.”
O n the drive back to the station, I ask ed T ak agi if his work had changed the
way he defined the real and the artificial.
“It is a common belief in Japan that dolls are m irrors,” he said. “T he dolls
show their owner’s true self.”
Morin, supra note 221 (emphasis added to highlight references to uncanniness).
224. Industry restraint may be the equivalent of what Mori, later in life, described
as a Buddhist version of a fully healthy person’s control of one’s desires. See Borody,
supra note 99, at 38 (“In order to function properly alongside robots, and to welcome
humanoid robots in our social world, . . . we must first learn how to control our own
desires . . . .”).
225. For example, public outcry forced e-commerce moguls like A mazon and
China’s A libaba to remove child sex dolls for sale on their sites. See Tom G rundy,
A libaba R em oves Child Sex D olls from A liE xpress O nline M ark etplace, H .K. F R E E
P R E SS (A pr. 14, 2018, 3:56 PM), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/04/14/alibabaremoves-child-sex-dolls-aliexpress-online-marketplace/ [https://perma.cc/XZ Y4WR SC]; Kieran G uilbert, A m az on Pulls Child Sex D olls A fter Criticism from UK
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though the processes for these two approaches occur somewhat differently within the context of human–robot interactions, both
approaches are equipped to either avoid or rely upon the effect of the
uncanny valley as normative social expectations dictate.
Indeed, the two approaches categorize the robotic agents according
to different criteria—Mori’s assessment is based on physicality, and
the ethorobotic approach is premised on functionality. A dditionally,
the two approaches apply differently, as is evidenced by the divergent
structures of the scales in their respective hypotheses—Mori’s hypothesis, which is premised on physicality, is limited in its application because robots will never physically appear more human-like than
humans. H owever, the ethorobotic approach, which is premised on
functionality, necessarily extends Mori’s limited hypothesis because
robots have transcended human functionality in so many areas. D espite these distinctions, however, both approaches nevertheless test
the same thing—public perception of a false reality. Mori’s approach
is based simply on the perception of the robot as looking and acting,
physically, like a human, and it plots the public’s reaction to, or tolerance of, its own perception. For example, under Mori’s theory, for at
least some of 19,000 online predators, Sweetie descended into the uncanny valley not because her physicality or activity changed; rather,
only the offenders’ perceptions of her human likeness varied. Likewise, the ethorobotic approach is based simply on the perception of
the robot as functioning like a human, and it plots the public’s reaction to, or tolerance of, this perception. For example, those who desire
alternative forms of intimacy or sexuality perceive the sex robot as
optimizing that function, therefore, their tolerance for sex robots plots
atop the peak of the niche in which it functions. Likewise, a child sex
robot equally may optimize its unique function within its separate but
unique niche—in fact, arguably, it may even function to treat
pedophiles and avoid future offenses—yet most perceive a child sex
W atchdog, R E U TE R S (A pr. 12, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-comchildren-sexcrimes/amazon-pulls-child-sex-dolls-after-criticism-from-uk-watchdog-id
U SKBN1H J2BG [https://perma.cc/P86P-KF3N]; see also John W. Yelland, T housands
Sign Petition to B an Child Sex D olls, KU TV (Nov. 10, 2017), https://abc3340.com/
news/nation-world/thousands-sign-petition-to-ban-child-sex-dolls [https://perma.cc/
PTD 9-YWB4] (describing petition to ban child sex dolls on Change.org, signed by
over 88,500 people).
226. See Miklósi et al., supra note 187; see also A lanna Vagianos, H ouse Passes B ill
B anning Sex D olls T hat L ook L ik e Children, H U FFING TO N P O ST (June 15, 2018, 11:34
A M), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/house-passes-bill-banning-sex-dolls-thatlook-like-children_us_5b23c2f7e4b07cb1712dcc7d [https://perma.cc/5D K6-LR Z 4]
(discussing legal prohibition). In the U nited Kingdom, where possession and production of child sex dolls are prohibited, the government seized 128 child sex dolls in
2017; the majority of the owners were found to also possess child pornography. A lice
B. Lloyd, Congressm an: Child Sex D olls A re Com ing— A nd W e’re N ot R eady,
W E E KLY STA ND A R D (Mar. 15, 2018, 12:15 PM), https://www.weeklystandard.com/alice-b-lloyd/congressman-child-sex-dolls-are-coming-mdash-and-were-not-ready
[https://perma.cc/KJW4-MCBG ].
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robot as intolerable, even within this latter context.227 Therefore, not
only do child sex robots plot negatively on the ethorobotic scale, but
in some instances, they are prohibited from functioning within an acceptable niche in society. Just as the robot’s physicality never changed
under Mori’s theory, the function of the robot never changed (or it
changed positively, if its theoretical purpose was for the treatment of
pedophilia) under the ethorobotic approach; rather, only the public’s
perception and acceptance of that function changed. Thus, despite the
critically distinctive contexts of physicality and functionality premised
in the respective hypotheses, both approaches nevertheless test and
account for the same outcome—public perception. For purposes of
this A rticle, then, the issue becomes: H ow do these respective approaches assess the public’s perception of sexual offenders?
IV.

A PPLYING

U NCA NNY V A LLE Y H YPO TH E SIS
SE XU A L O FFE ND E R S

TH E

TO

Just as Mori’s diagram includes categories of nonhuman agents that
progressively transition on the horizontal axis of human likeness from
inanimate objects, starting with industrial robots, to healthy human
beings, I premise that there is an analogous progressive transition of
categories of agents within the context of civilly committed sexual offenders that is similarly plotted. In this analogy for sexual offenders,
the horizontal axis represents transitions from an active perpetrator,
plotted furthest to the left on the diagram (analogous to Mori’s industrial robot), to the fully healthy human, which Mori designates to the
far right of the diagram. Ideally, in this context, agents progress from
left to right—from perpetration to healthy human likeness—through
treatment in the civil commitment process. Between these two polarized categories of sexual offender are seven additional categories of
sexual offender that represent progression, from left to right, through
the civil commitment process. These include: (1) a convicted sexual
offender serving a criminal sentence (i.e., incarcerated); (2) a sexual
offender who has served a criminal sentence but is civilly committed;
(3) a sexual offender who is civilly committed and participating in
treatment but who has not yet been determined to be qualified for
release; (4) a sexual offender who has satisfied the requirements of
treatment and is determined to be qualified for conditional release
and reintegration but is denied; (5) a sexual offender who is determined to be qualified for, and is granted, conditional release and reintegration but recidivates or is otherwise unsuccessful and, therefore, is
227. See Marie-H elen Maras & Lauren R . Shapiro, Child Sex D olls and R obots:
M ore T han Just an Uncanny V alley, 21 J. I NTE R NE T L. 3 (2017) (arguing to ban child
sex dolls); D aniel M. D onovan, Child Sex D olls, the N ewest O utlet for Pedophiles,
M ust B e B anned, H ILL (D ec. 12, 2017, 12:15 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/judicial/364438-child-sex-dolls-the-newest-outlet-for-pedophiles-must-be-banned
[https://perma.cc/7X23-A C32].
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recommitted; (6) a sexual offender who is conditionally released and
reintegrated, does not recidivate, and is otherwise successful; and (7) a
sexual offender who is unconditionally released and fully reintegrated
into society. These categories of sexual offender typify the progression
of a theoretically successful sexual offender treatment program. A s
offenders progress and succeed in treatment over time—as indicated
on the horizontal axis in the diagram below—they become more integrable into society. Thus, the scaled diagram in Figure 8 represents an
offender’s proximity to successful integration or “integrability” over
time.
F IG U R E 8
A Progression Scale for Sexual Offender Treatment and
Integrability Over Time
Healthy Human

I
N
T
E
G
R
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y

Unconditional Reintegration

Successful Conditional Reintegration

Unsuccessful Conditional Reintegration

Denied Conditional Reintegration

Participation in Treatment

Civil Commitment

Incarcerated

Perpetrator

T R E AT M E N T +

Comparing all the diagrams represented in this A rticle, note that
the vertical axis of the various diagrams represents different concepts.
In Mori’s diagram (Figure 1), the vertical axis represents “Familiarity.” 228 In the diagram depicting animated and computer graphic characters (Figure 3), the vertical axis represents the “E mpathetic
R esponse” to the characters.229 A nd in the ethorobotic diagram (Figure 6), the vertical axis measures “E ase for Interaction.” 230 Because
228. See supra Figure 1.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 141–43 and Figure 3.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 191–94 and Figure 6.
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the narrow issue discussed here focuses on the ability of the sexual
offender to reintegrate into society, which is (or should be) one of the
purposes of the civil commitment process, I have designated the vertical axis in Figure 8 as representing an offender’s “integrability.”
To better represent each category of offender in Figure 8, consider
individual offenders that I propose are representative of each category. With respect to the first agent in the diagram—the perpetrator—consider the case of R oy Whiting, who murdered eight-year-old
Sarah Payne in West Sussex, E ngland, in July 2000.231 Whiting, pictured in Figure 9, epitomizes society’s common perception of a sexually violent predator as some sort of hideous creature—the
misconceived but stereotypical disheveled old man in a long trench
coat, lurking in the shadows and waiting to snatch children away.
Whiting admitted to abducting and sexually assaulting a nine-year-old
girl in 1995.232 A s a result, he was sentenced to four years in jail.233
A fter two years, even though a psychiatrist who assessed Whiting
stated that Whiting was likely to reoffend and could possibly kill,
Whiting was released from prison in 1997 and was placed on the sexual offender registry.234 Nevertheless, on July 1, 2000, Whiting abducted eight-year-old Sarah Payne while she played with her siblings
F IG U R E 9
Roy Whiting

231. T im eline: T he Sarah Payne T ragedy, BBC N E WS (D ec. 12, 2001, 2:53 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/1703534.stm [https://perma.cc/64L7SWH J] (describing daily update of Sarah Payne investigation).
232. See Sarah Payne K iller R oy W hiting O pens Up in Prison L etters, A R G U S (A pr.
25, 2012), https://www.theargus.co.uk/news/9669161.sarah-payne-killer-roy-whitingopens-up-in-prison-letters/ [https://perma.cc/55WL-JR XU ] (discussing another sexual
assault of a young girl that R oy Whiting committed).
233. Id.
234. Jason Bennetto & Paul Peachey, Payne V erdict: A ttack on G irl of N ine
B rought Jail T erm and a ‘H igh R isk ’ T ag, I ND E P . (D ec. 13, 2001), https://
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/payne-verdict-attack-on-girl-of-nine-brought-
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in a field near her grandmother’s home.235 Sixteen days later, Sarah
Payne’s body was found buried in a shallow grave, just miles from
where she was abducted.236 Whiting was convicted of her murder and
sentenced to life in prison—one of the rare times in British legal history when such a sentence was imposed for such a crime.
In 2010, Whiting’s sentence was reduced to a minimum term of
forty years, but the case led to a frenzied media campaign for public
access to the sexual offender registry and tighter controls on sexual
offenders released from prison—changes commonly referred to in E ngland as “Sarah’s Law,” analogous to “Megan’s Law” 237 in the U nited
States. A t Whiting’s trial, Sarah’s older brother, who saw Whiting at
the time of the abduction, described Whiting as a “greasy” and
“scruffy-looking man with ‘yellowish’ teeth,” who grinned and waved
as he drove away with Sarah in the back of his van.238 In fact, Whiting’s nickname in prison is “Catweasel” due to his unkempt appearance.239 Based on the depravity of his acts and his appearance, many
reports in the media dehumanize Whiting as a “monster” that should
be locked away forever, unfit to participate in society.240 I premise
jail-term-and-a-high-risk-tag-9201052.html [https://perma.cc/3A XA -D D 5B] (discussing R oy Whiting’s history of violence and various officials’ assessments of Whiting).
235. Sarah Payne: the T im etable, G U A R D IA N (D ec. 12, 2001), https://www.theguardi
an.com/society/2001/dec/12/childprotection2 [https://perma.cc/E D 4A -LD 3Z ] (describing chronological timeline of Sarah Payne’s case).
236. Id.
237. “Megan’s Law” refers to Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old New Jersey girl who
was sexually assaulted and murdered by a neighbor, Jesse Timmendequas, in 1994.
U nbeknown to Megan’s family, Timmendequas was a convicted sexual offender. In
1994, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes A gainst Children and Sexually
Violent O ffender R egistration A ct, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796,
2038, as amended, 42 U .S.C. § 14071, which sets minimum standards for state sexual
offender registration programs. The subsection of the federal law that now requires
law enforcement to provide information to the public regarding registered sexual offenders is referred to as “Megan’s Law.” Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat.
1345 (1996). By 1996, every state, the D istrict of Columbia, and the Federal G overnment had enacted some variation of Megan’s Law.
238. Shuaib Shafi-D NU , T he M urder of Sarah Payne – W hat H appened 17 Y ears
A go?, SU R R E Y L IVE (July 20, 2017, 9:21 A M), https://www.getsurrey.co.uk/news/surrey-news/murder-sarah-payne-what-happened-13350480 [https://perma.cc/8J9C-9JC3]
(discussing Sarah Payne’s story with her siblings).
239. Jeremy A rmstrong et al., K iller R oy W hiting Found with Pictures of H is Child
V ictim Sarah Payne, M IR R O R (Jan. 27, 2012), https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/
killer-roy-whiting-found-with-pictures-209503 [https://perma.cc/5N27-SA VP] (describing officials’ reactions to discovery that Whiting possessed pictures of his victim in his
jail cell).
240. See, e.g., Lauren Fruen & Sofia Petkar, Pure E vil: W ho is Sarah Payne M urderer R oy W hiting, W here is H e N ow and W hat Previous Convictions D id H e H ave?,
SU N (July 19, 2017), https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/4036616/roy-whiting-sarah-paynemurderer-previous-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/53Z R -TD BT]; A M onster W ho
W ould K ill A gain, A R G U S (A pr. 23, 2004), https://www.theargus.co.uk/news/
5094287.A _monster_who_would_kill_again/ [https://perma.cc/9PLD -38K6] (“Whiting
is a disgusting, psychopathic monster, an evil, evil man who should never be let loose
on society ever again.”).
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here and throughout this series of articles that although there are, of
course, exceptions, this monstrous, dehumanized conception of Whiting generally typifies the public’s perception of all sexual offenders as
incurable monsters because all sexual offenders are perceived as perpetrating equally intolerable and “un-human-like” or “inhuman”
acts.241 O n the scale represented in Figure 8, I suspect the public
would plot perpetrators at the bottom of the scale and to the far left,
with the least progression in the treatment system and as the least
integrable into society.
H owever, when a sex offender is caught, convicted, and incarcerated, the integrability of the offender is slightly increased beyond that
of a perpetrator because the offender is incarcerated, serving an appropriate criminal sentence for the offense he or she committed, and
beginning the process that, ideally, will transition the offender from a
perpetrator to a reintegrated member of human society. A lthough the
public may still view the offender as a dehumanized monster, the system is designed for the offender to serve the appropriate sentence,
undergo civil commitment, and participate in treatment until he or she
successfully completes the program and qualifies for some form of release. E pitomizing the public’s view of an appropriately incarcerated
sexual offender is former Penn State U niversity football coach, Jerry
Sandusky, pictured in Figure 10.242 A lthough the public may perceive
Sandusky as a monster because of his crimes, in reality, in the context
of an ideal progression toward reintegration and living as a healthy
F IG U R E 10
Jerry Sandusky

241. See Levine & Meiners, supra note 17.
242. In 2012, Sandusky was convicted of forty-five counts of child sexual abuse and
was sentenced to thirty to sixty years in prison for abusing numerous young boys
between 1994 and 2009, all of which stemmed from his interaction with the boys
through “The Second Mile,” a charity organization that Sandusky founded in 1977 to
assist troubled young boys. See F LA NNE R Y & O ’B R IE N , supra note 4, at 978–79.
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member of society, he is more integrable than an offender at large
because he has begun the process that offers treatment and, therefore,
is categorized slightly higher than a perpetrator in Figure 8.
Plotted next on the progression in Figure 8, moving from “perpetrator” to “healthy human” in society, is the offender who has served his
or her criminal sentence for the offense but who is civilly committed.
To represent those who are civilly committed for sexual offenses, we
may picture Leroy H endricks, who is the defendant in K ansas v. H endrick s243 and is pictured in Figure 11. H endricks had a history of sexually molesting children, for which he was convicted and incarcerated.
When he completed his sentence and was set to be released, the State
of Kansas petitioned to have H endricks civilly committed under the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator A ct. H endricks’s case established
the constitutionality of sexual offender statutes and the procedures
required for the indefinite civil commitment of those convicted of a
sexual offense and whom the state deems dangerous because of a
mental illness or abnormality. Prisoners who are civilly committed
plot higher on the “Integrability” scale (Figure 8) than those who are
merely incarcerated because they will have the opportunity to participate in a post-release civil commitment treatment program and work
toward reintegration into the community, while posing no risk to
society.
Not all civilly committed offenders participate in the sexual offender treatment program that is available during civil commitment.244 H owever, comparatively, offenders who do participate in
F IG U R E 11
Leroy Hendricks

243. Kansas v. H endricks, 521 U .S. 346 (1997).
244. A ccording to 2010 data pertaining to the MSO P, at a time when no offenders
had ever been discharged from the program, about 80% of civilly committed sexual
offenders in the program were participating in treatment. See O FFICE O F TH E M INNE SO TA L E G ISLA TIVE A U D ITO R , C IVIL C O MMITME NT O F SE X O FFE ND E R S: E VA LU A TIO N
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appropriate treatment programs are more integrable because treatment is one of the primary goals of civil commitment, and participation in treatment arguably demonstrates progress toward becoming a
healthy human being who is able to function effectively in society and
interact with other human beings without imposing danger. Thus, on
the “Integrability” scale (Figure 8), those who participate in treatment
plot higher than those who do not.
Civilly committed offenders who successfully complete the treatment program but who are not yet approved for release, or who are
not qualified to be released, plot at a slightly higher point on the “Integrability” scale (Figure 8) in the progression toward healthy integration because they have successfully participated in treatment and,
ideally, should be postured for release and successful reintegration
into society. R epresenting such civilly committed offenders, consider
D ennis R ichard Steiner, pictured in Figure 12.
In 1992, to avoid a twelve-year prison sentence for a sexual offense
conviction, Steiner agreed to enter a precursor to the current MSO P.
Steiner was told he would spend no more than four years in the precursor program, in which he agreed to participate in treatment. H owever, in 2015, at the time of the litigation in K arsjens v. Jesson, Steiner
was sixty-six years old and had been civilly committed at Minnesota’s
Moose Lake facility for twenty-four years. H e was the longest civil
committee under MSO P and the first offender to testify in the case.245
F IG U R E 12
D ennis Richard Steiner

R E PO R T 56 (Mar. 2011), https://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/ccso.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7K68-U Q 4A ].
245. E lizabeth Mohr, Federal Judge D em ands Changes to Controversial M innesota
Sex O ffender Program , ST . P A U L P IO NE E R P R E SS (A ug. 10, 2015, 6:15 A M), http://
www.grandforksherald.com/news/crime-and-courts/3814323-federal-judge-demandschanges-controversial-minnesota-sex-offender [https://perma.cc/R J9V-2KU W]; see
also Steve Karnowski, Sex O ffender D escribes Y ears T rying For R elease From Pro-
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In the ideal progression toward reintegration, Steiner plots higher on
the “Integrability” scale (Figure 8) as a civil committee who has successfully completed treatment and, ideally, should be able to be reintegrated into society.
The next category of offender in the process of moving toward reintegration into society is the offender who is subject to supervision
under conditional or provisional release. Conditional release allows
the offender to physically leave the secured treatment facility to reside
in a residential treatment facility, half-way house, or perhaps even a
private residence, located off the secured grounds of the treatment
facility and, therefore, plots higher on the “Integrability” axis (Figure
8). H owever, conditional release requires the offender to submit to
extensive supervision and strictly enforced conditions that, if not satisfied, will result in the offender’s recommitment.
Not all offenders who apply for provisional release are successful.
For example, the first offender to complete Minnesota’s required
treatment program and to be recommended for provisional release
was John R ydberg, pictured in Figure 13. In 2010, a state human services panel selected R ydberg as one of several conditional release test
cases. H owever, D epartment of H uman Services Commissioner Lucinda Jesson opposed R ydberg’s release.246 R ydberg was civilly comF IG U R E 13
John Rydberg

gram , W A SH . T IME S (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/
17/suit-against-minnesota-sex-offender-program-enters/ [https://perma.cc/582N4G S3]. Steiner stated, “There’s no out. They planned it that way. They had no intent
on letting anybody out . . . . The Legislature’s the one who’s got this place strapped to
the ground, and they’ll tell you that right to your face.” E lizabeth Mohr, T alk s in
Controversial M innesota Sex O ffender Program Case B egin, D U LU TH N E WS T R IB .
(A ug. 9, 2015, 3:50 PM), https://www.duluthnewstribune.com/news/3814263-talks-controversial-minnesota-sex-offender-program-case-begin [https://perma.cc/7L5E WM9M].
246. Paul McE nroe, R apist W on’t B e R eleased from Sex O ffender Program , ST .
P A U L STA R T R IB . (May 18, 2012, 10:59 PM), http://www.startribune.com/rapist-won-tbe-released-from-sex-offender-program/152070425/ [https://perma.cc/D 7SD -NH A M].

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-3\TWL305.txt

602

unknown

Seq: 62

T E X A S A &M L A W R E V IE W

13-MA Y-19

14:24

[Vol. 6

mitted in 1993 after admitting to more than ninety sexual offenses,
some of which were of a particularly sadistic and humiliating nature.
Based on Jesson’s opposition, and the fact that R ydberg was sometimes evasive and threatening with his treatment teams, a panel of the
State Supreme Court denied R ydberg’s release in 2012.247 Thus,
R ydberg was never conditionally released. H owever, in terms of integrability, he progressed further than D ennis Steiner and, therefore,
plots slightly higher in Figure 8. A s a result of R ydberg’s denial, the
first person actually to be conditionally discharged from the Minnesota program—R ay H ubbard—was conditionally discharged in 2000.
H owever, although H ubbard did not reoffend while released, in 2003,
his discharge was revoked for failing to satisfy the conditions of his
release, for leaving the state, and because his therapist believed H ubbard would recidivate. H ubbard died in 2007, at the age of forty-five,
while recommitted.248
Likewise, the first sexual offender to be civilly committed under
California’s Sexually Violent Predator law—Christopher E vans H ubbart, notoriously known as the “Pillowcase R apist,” 249—was not successful functioning under conditional release. H ubbart is pictured in
Figure 14. In 1972, H ubbart was convicted of rape and released after
F IG U R E 14
Christopher Evans Hubbart

247. Id.
248. Warren Wolfe, A T urning Point for State’s Sex O ffender Program , ST . P A U L
STA R T R IB . (Feb. 20, 2012, 4:11 PM), http://www.startribune.com/man-who-admittedto-molesting-29-to-be-first-in-decade-to-be-freed/139595093/ [https://perma.cc/
W4YU -T5B6].
249. H ubbart was known as the “Pillowcase R apist” because he placed pillowcases
over the heads of his victims during his assaults. Marisa G erber, ‘Pillowcase R apist,’
W ho W as L iving in L .A . A rea, M ust B e Confined to a State H ospital, Judge R ules,
L.A . T IME S (Jan. 13, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-la-lnpillowcase-rapist-ruling-20170113-story.html [https://perma.cc/26NS-H G Z 8].
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serving his criminal sentence.250 H ubbart was convicted of additional
rapes several years later and spent eight more years in prison. Two
months after his subsequent release from prison, he assaulted another
woman and returned to prison. Before he completed his sentence,
prosecutors petitioned the court to civilly commit H ubbart to Coalinga State H ospital, where he was civilly committed.
In July 2014, after waiting a year to find a suitable location where a
landlord was willing to rent a residence to him, H ubbart was conditionally released from his civil commitment at Coalinga State H ospital. H e moved into a small house in the desert, forty miles north of
Los A ngeles, subject to sixteen pages of explicit conditions, including
twenty-four-hour guarded surveillance, a G PS ankle monitor, participation in group and individual therapy sessions twice per week, a
strict curfew, random searches, drug testing, polygraph analysis, and
limited permission to use the internet or watch television programs
that might arouse him.251 In addition, however, H ubbart was subjected to death threats and constant protests and demonstrations by
local citizens outside his home.252 In May 2015, prosecutors requested
that H ubbart be recommitted after he let the power on his ankle monitor expire, but a judge denied that request. Then, in A ugust 2016,
after only two years of supervised reintegration, 65-year-old H ubbart
was arrested and returned to Coalinga State H ospital for failing five
different polygraph tests and violating several other terms of his conditional release.253 Nevertheless, in terms of his progress in the treatment process moving toward healthy reintegration, H ubbart plots
higher on the “Integrability” axis in Figure 8 because of his conditional, albeit temporary, release.

250. Marisa G erber, Forty Y ears L ater, V ivid M em ories of the Pillowcase R apist,
L.A . T IME S (Jan. 9, 2016), http://graphics.latimes.com/sexually-violent-predator-history/ [https://perma.cc/33S2-Y3R G ] (discussing history of H ubbart’s case).
251. For a PD F of the terms and conditions, see H ubbart Signs a 16-Page T erm sA nd-Conditions D ocum ent, L.A . T IME S (A pr. 17, 2014), http://documents.latimes.
com/prior-release-hubbart-signs-16-page-terms-and-conditions-document/ [https://
perma.cc/TA 25-MG 9A ].
252. Judge R evok es R elease of N otorious ‘Pillowcase R apist’, CBS S.F. (Jan. 13,
2017, 1:53 PM), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2017/01/13/pillowcase-rapist-christo
pher-hubbart-release-revoked/ [https://perma.cc/3E 2L-R T3W]; Veronica R ocha &
Marisa G erber, ‘Pillowcase R apist’ Christopher H ubbart B ack In Custody A fter Failing T o M eet R elease T erm s, L.A . T IME S (A ug. 9, 2016, 7:50 PM), http://
www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-pillowcase-rapist-christopher-hubbart-arrested
-20160809-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/49LB-Z 4U Y].
253. ‘Pillowcase R apist’ L ock ed B ack Up O ver ‘D istorted T hink ing,’ N.Y. P O ST
(Jan. 14, 2017, 11:20 A M), https://nypost.com/2017/01/14/pillowcase-rapist-lockedback-up-over-distorted-thinking/ [https://perma.cc/G X8V-8XXY].

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-3\TWL305.txt

604

unknown

Seq: 64

T E X A S A &M L A W R E V IE W

13-MA Y-19

14:24

[Vol. 6

The first successful conditional discharge from the Minnesota program began in 2012, when sixty-four-year-old Clarence O pheim, pictured in Figure 15, was provisionally released from MSO P.254 O pheim
entered MSO P in 1994—the year it opened—after serving four-and-ahalf years in prison for molesting an eleven-year-old boy.255 O pheim
admitted to molesting twenty-nine boys, ages eight to seventeen.256
H owever, O pheim was conditionally released to a halfway house after
completing the required treatment program during more than twenty
years of civil commitment. A t the time, the success of O pheim’s release was critical for many other offenders who had all but given up
hope of ever being released.257 Perhaps partly because of O pheim’s
success, since the litigation surrounding Minnesota’s program, a total
of eight offenders, including O pheim, have been placed on conditional
release.258 A ccordingly, O pheim represents the category of offender
who successfully, but conditionally, reintegrates into society and,
therefore, plots yet higher on the “Integrability” axis in Figure 8.
F IG U R E 15
Clarence Opheim

The final stage of the process of reintegration is unconditional release. A dministrators of the MSO P “believe[ ] slow reintegration into
society is the best way for many of the offenders to prepare themselves for the real world.” 259 A ccordingly, “Minnesota is one of the
254. Steve Karnowski, Court D eclines to H ear Challenge to State Sex O ffender Program , F O X (O ct. 8, 2017, 10:58 A M), http://www.fox9.com/news/court-declines-tohear-challenge-to-state-sex-offender-program [https://perma.cc/33R 3-D KE W]; Wolfe,
supra note 248.
255. Karnowski, supra note 245.
256. Id.
257. See R upa Shenoy, Fam ilies of Sex O ffenders Find H ope in Clarence O pheim ’s
R elease, MPR N E WS (Mar. 5, 2012), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2012/03/05/minnesota-sex-offender-program [https://perma.cc/8X5Z -PE N8].
258. Karnowski, supra note 245.
259. Briana Bierschbach, A fter Y ears of Indefinitely L ock ing Up Sex O ffenders,
M innesota N ow Faces a T hornier Issue: H ow to L et T hem O ut, M INN . P O ST . (A pr. 13,
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only states with a step-down system in place where clients slowly prepare for reentrance into the community.” 260 In 2016, twenty-six-yearold E ric Terhaar, whom I choose not to picture,261 became the first
sexual offender in the Minnesota program for whom a special review
board recommended full, unconditional release.262 Terhaar was one of
about sixty offenders at MSO P who were committed because of sexual offenses perpetrated as a juvenile. A lthough they committed no
sexual offenses as an adult, they remained civilly committed in the
program. A rguably, juvenile offenders pose a low risk of recidivism.263
Thus, in 2014, a group of court-appointed experts in the ongoing Minnesota litigation evaluated the treatment program and singled-out
Terhaar for immediate release, without any conditions. D espite major
disciplinary problems during his supervised release and objection
from the Commissioner of the D epartment of H uman Services, a
three-member Judicial A ppeal Panel granted Terhaar’s unconditional
release in A ugust 2016.264 A ccordingly, in the context of integrability,
Terhaar plots even higher in Figure 8.

2016), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2016/04/after-years-indefinitely-locking-sex-offenders-minnesota-now-faces-thornier/ [https://perma.cc/F3WN-G JQ N].
260. Id. (quoting Nancy Johnston, D eputy Commissioner with the D epartment of
H uman Services, which oversees the MSO P).
261. E ric Terhaar is not pictured here because he committed his sexual offenses as
a juvenile, at ages ten and fourteen; he was convicted of no known sexual offenses as
an adult. Whereas this fact plays a significant role in the argument that civil commitment proceedings are particularly questionable constitutionally as applied to juvenile
offenders who are committed indefinitely without having committed any sexual offense as an adult, I wish to respect this juvenile offender’s privacy by not publicizing
his picture.
262. Chris Serres, State Clears the W ay for First Unconditional R elease from M inn.
Sex O ffender Program , ST . P A U L STA R T R IB . (Sept. 7, 2016, 11:13 PM), http://
www.startribune.com/state-clears-the-way-for-first-unconditional-release-from-minnsex-offender-program/392670041 [https://perma.cc/H 36J-7KG B].
263. Bierschbach, supra note 259.
264. In K arsjens v. Jessons, the court recognized Terhaar’s plight, stating:
A lthough D efendants were responsive to the experts’ discovery of the fact
that a juvenile offender like Terhaar was being held indefinitely at MSO P
despite, in the experts’ opinion, his lack of dangerousness or need for sex
offender treatment, this does not explain how this troubling state of affairs
came about. It is obvious that but for this litigation, Terhaar, who was stuck
with hundreds of other persons in Phase I of MSO P, would likely have languished for years in the prison-like environment of MSO P–Moose Lake
without any realistic hope of gaining his freedom. . . . A nd of course it is of
great concern to the Court that this may not be an aberrant case of system
failure but is symptomatic of a larger systemic problem of constitutional
concern.
Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F. Supp. 3d 958, 977 (D . Minn. 2014).
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In January 2018, fifty-year-old Kirk A lan Fugelseth, pictured in Figure 16, became the first person after Terhaar to be unconditionally
discharged from the MSO P.265 U nlike Terhaar, however, Fugelseth
admitted to molesting, as an adult in the 1990s, thirty-one children in
A rizona, O regon, and Minnesota, with some victims as young as
three-years-old.266 In 2001, Fugelseth was convicted of possessing
child pornography and was incarcerated, after which he was civilly
committed in 2003. A fter fifteen years of incarceration and commitment in the MSO P, in 2016, he requested full, unconditional discharge
from the program, but the review panel denied his request. U pon
Fugelseth’s petition for reconsideration, the Minnesota Court of A ppeals determined that there was insufficient evidence that Fugelseth
needed continued inpatient treatment or that he remained a dangerous threat to the public, and it granted his unconditional release.267
Thus, in terms of the progress through the treatment process toward
reintegration, on the “Integrability” axis in Figure 8, Fugelseth plots
as integrating most closely to fully healthy persons in society because
he reintegrated with no conditions imposed upon him.
F IG U R E 16
Kirk A lan Fugelseth

There are similar “unconditional release” stories in other states,268
but not all commitment discharges in other states are as novel as those
265. See Forum News Service, Court Supports D ischarge of Convicted Clay County
Child A buser from Sex O ffender Program , B R A INE R D D ISPA TCH (Jan. 29, 2018, 9:35
PM), http://www.brainerddispatch.com/news/4395602-court-supports-discharge-convicted-clay-county-child-abuser-sex-offender-program [https://perma.cc/4SJZ -L6L5].
266. Id.
267. In re Commitment of Fugelseth, 907 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. A pp. 2018). O n
January 29, 2018, the State A ttorney G eneral filed in the State Supreme Court a Petition for R eview of D ecision of Court of A ppeals, which was denied on A pril 17, 2018.
268. See, e.g., Thomas Clouse, Jury Sets Convicted R apist T errance L aram ie Free
A fter Civil Com m itm ent T rial, SPO KE SMA N -R E V . (Feb. 1, 2017, 7:07 PM), http://
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in Minnesota. In Wisconsin, for example, there have been more than
100 sexual offenders unconditionally released from civil commitment
and reintegrated into society, and more than 200 offenders granted
supervised release, all with low rates of recidivism.269 Such variation
raises the obvious question of whether the sudden controversial releases in Minnesota are simply irresponsible reactions to the recent
litigation as a way to demonstrate that the existing program really is
working, or whether there has been an effective paradigm shift in the
treatment and assessment methods that have resulted from the court’s
directives to improve the unconstitutional aspects of the former program. Which is perception, and which is reality?
The goal, of course, is for treatment to be effective, assessments to
be accurate, and only appropriate offenders with a low risk of recidivism to be unconditionally released to reintegrate with fully healthy
humans in society. Therefore, for purposes of completing a working
representation of the successful process, I include Masahito Mori, pictured in Figure 17, as the fully “healthy human,” plotting highest on
the scale represented in Figure 8.
F IG U R E 17
Masahito Mori

A ccordingly, in an ideal progression from perpetrator to reintegration, through civil commitment and treatment, the integrability of an
offender represents the degree to which each individual offender becomes more “healthy-human-like” and, ideally, should be able to reintegrate successfully into human society. Thus, as treatment progresses,
www.spokesman.com/stories/2017/feb/01/jury-sets-convicted-rapist-terrance-laramiefree-a/ [https://perma.cc/T6BY-TP3U ] (describing the case of Terrance Michael Laramie, who was the first sexual offender in Spokane County, Washington, to be unconditionally released from civil commitment).
269. Bierschbach, supra note 259.
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when plotted on a continuum scale, a successful progression from
“perpetrator” to “healthy human” should present as in Figure 18.
F IG U R E 18
Successful Progression through Sexual Offender Civil
Commitment, from “Perpetrator”
to “Healthy Human”

R ecall that on Mori’s diagram involving robots, the vertical axis
represents the subject’s affinity for an obviously inhuman agent (a
commercial robot) as its physical human likeness progressively increases along the horizontal axis. Thus, the horizontal axis in Mori’s
diagram represents the agent’s “human likeness.” Within the context
of the public’s perception of the integrability of sexual offenders, however, the public does not form its opinion of sexual offenders based on
the “human likeness” of the agent’s physicality but rather on the
“truthlikeness” or “verisimilitude” of the sexual offender’s human nature. Thus, to make an accurate distinction, when applying Mori’s hypothesis to the context of sexual offenders, I describe the horizontal
axis as representing the progressively increasing “verisimilitude” or
“truthlikeness” of the agent’s human nature. It is the conflicted paradox between the public’s perception of sexual offenders as inhuman
monsters and the presentation of sexual offenders as healthy, integrable members of society that determines the success of reintegration
and, consequently, the constitutionality of the civil commitment process itself.
Therefore, analogizing Mori’s uncanny valley hypothesis, I propose
that the “public perception” categorization of sexual offenders should
appear as in Figure 19.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-3\TWL305.txt

2019]

unknown

Seq: 69

13-MA Y-19

A N “E T H O R O B O T IC” PE R SPE CT IV E

14:24

609

F IG U R E 19
Mori’s “U ncanny Valley” Scale Plotting the Public
Perception of Sexual Offenders

Note that the vertical axis in Figure 19 scales public perception, with a
low plot representing negative public perception and a higher plot
representing a more positive public perception. The horizontal axis in
Figure 19 scales the offender’s verisimilitude, vis-à-vis the truthlikeness of his or her “healthy human” nature.
O n the scale in Figure 19, agents plot from left to right as they progress through the ideal civil commitment treatment process, from perpetrator to healthy human. Whereas I premise that the public
generally views all perpetrators as inhuman monsters, “perpetrators”
(represented by R oy Whiting) are categorized to the left, representing
very low public perception and minimal verisimilitude. A s described
previously, the public views sexual offenders serving prison sentences
(represented by Jerry Sandusky) with a slightly higher view than perpetrators because they are incarcerated and presumably serving a sentence justified by their crimes. Slightly higher on the scale of public
perception are those who are civilly committed (represented by Leroy
H endricks). A t the first peak on the “Public Perception” scale are
those, like D ennis Steiner, who have completed their treatment program and, therefore, appear more “healthy human-like,” yet remain
committed in a locked facility despite posing little or no risk of danger
to the public, which, in reality, the public favors. Therefore, offenders
like Steiner are viewed more positively than those who have not completed treatment and those who are released.
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A s offenders progressively approach release and reintegration,
however, they gradually descend into Mori’s uncanny valley. O ffenders like John R ydberg, who are recommended for conditional release
but are denied, plot lower in the public’s perception than offenders
like Steiner because they have more potential for release, but they are
not quite relegated to the uncanny valley because they have not only
completed treatment, but they remain committed to a secured facility
and pose no immediate risk of harm to the public.
O ffenders like Christopher E van H ubbart, who have obtained conditional release but have proven unsuccessful and have been recommitted, plot lower on the scale than offenders like R ydberg because
they have already been released and have failed. Nevertheless, they
have completed treatment and are recommitted, thereby posing no
continued threat to public safety. A s depicted in Figure 19, however,
their release and failed reintegration plots them into the uncanny valley, whereas the public is now confronted with category uncertainty—
A re they healthy enough to be reintegrated into society or do they
pose sufficient danger to require continued commitment? A re they
now healthy humans or do they remain inhuman monsters? In the
public’s eyes, offenders like H ubbart still plot higher than unconditionally released offenders like E ric Terhaar. While this is certainly
because those like H ubbart are once again committed to a secured
facility, even upon release, they are identified by their restrictions as a
conditionally-released offender. Whereas offenders like E ric Terhaar,
who reintegrate into society subject to no restrictions, present as
nearly indistinguishable from a healthy human in society and thereby
are perceived, nevertheless, as uncanny.
Plotting lower on the descent into the uncanny valley, in the public’s view, are offenders like Clarence O pheim, who have completed
treatment and arguably pose little risk to society but who are subject
to numerous restrictions and oversights that, in theory, offer some
protection to the public, even if only through the disclosure of information that puts the public on notice that this person is not fully
healthy and, therefore, is someone from whom the public may need to
protect itself. In a practical sense, Clarence O pheim is no different
than D ennis Steiner in terms of having successfully completed treatment and posing little risk of recidivism. In that sense, O pheim and
Steiner are essentially the same in terms of “healthy human likeness.”
H owever, in reality, because Steiner remains committed with no access to the public, the public perceives him clearly—with no category
confusion—as a sexual offender (albeit one who presents minimal
risk). Therefore, Steiner plots higher than O pheim on Mori’s pre-release peak. The public would perceive O pheim, post-release, more
negatively than it would Steiner, pre-released, because the public perceives O pheim as posing more risk since he is now reintegrated into
society and has access to the public (albeit subject to identifying re-
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strictions). A s with released offenders like Fugelseth, this perception
conflicts with the designers’ presentation of O pheim as qualified for
reintegration into the environment of the fully healthy human. Because of this category confusion, O pheim plots more negatively, postrelease, than Steiner plots pre-released.
In the public’s eyes, offenders who are unconditionally released,
like Kyle A lan Fugelseth, plot most negatively on Mori’s scale. D espite successful completion of treatment and minimal risk of recidivism, which is precisely the purpose of civil commitment and what the
public appears to want, offenders who are unconditionally released
with no identifying restrictions or oversights, and who are fully reintegrated into society, are perceived by the public as inhuman monsters
roaming unchecked throughout the countryside. This is because, by
definition, the designers of civil commitment programs—legislatures,
governing officials, public policy-makers, and courts—are representing once violent, mentally ill, and dangerous but now treated, sexual
predators as functional, healthy human beings in society. Thus, the
public perceives, at once, an agent who presents as a healthy human
but who has acted inhumanely and inconsistently with the norms of
human society. With no safeguard in place or distinguishing feature
demonstrated, such as a G PS monitor, housing restriction, or some
imposition on personal privacy, any of which might distinguish the unconditionally released sexual offender from the fully healthy human,
the public perceives conflict, experiences category uncertainty, and
relegates the unconditionally released offender to the peak of the uncanny valley.
Thus, despite the arguable success of the treatment program and
the fact that, as presented, an offender who is unconditionally released most closely functions like a healthy human being, the public
perceives such an offender as uncanny and receives the offender with
fear because it perceives the irreconcilability of a violent sexual offender being presented to society as a healthy human being. Without
any distinguishing indicator, the public is unsure whether to categorize
the agent as a sexual offender whom one should protect against or as a
healthy human being who should reintegrate with ease. Consequently,
unconditionally released sexual offenders are relegated to the uncanny valley. Note, however, that from the perspective of many, juvenile offenders who have committed no sexual offenses as an adult, like
E ric Terhaar, may plot slightly higher on Mori’s scale upon release
but, in the public’s perception, may nevertheless invoke fear and,
therefore, plot on Mori’s scale as remaining in the uncanny valley.
Note also that, from the public’s perspective, once an offender is
released—either conditionally or unconditionally—no offender ever
begins to ascend toward healthy human likeness. The exception, for
some, may be juvenile offenders, like Terhaar. H owever, in the public’s perception, the only offenders who become more tolerable or
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more acceptable are those who are either incarcerated or who are
civilly committed and receiving treatment. R egardless of the success
of the treatment, however, the public views more negatively any offender with access to the community. Ironically, even though O pheim
is less “healthy human-like” than Fugelseth (whereas O pheim requires conditional restrictions for his release and Fugelseth does not),
O pheim nevertheless plots higher than Fugelseth in the eyes of the
public because the restrictions placed on O pheim identify him as a
sexual offender. Such identifiers dispel the public’s category confusion
for O pheim but are lacking for the public’s categorization of Fugelseth, thereby abdicating him to the peak of the uncanny valley. This
paradox between the public’s perception of all sexual offenders and
the reality of the risk of recidivism of conditionally or unconditionally
released sexual offenders is what defines the real “healthy human likeness” (i.e., the verisimilitude) of the reintegrated sexual offender.270
Like the nonhuman robot that is designed to perfectly integrate and
function in human society, when viewed through Mori’s lens of human
likeness, there is a perceived verisimilitude of sexual offenders that
leads sexual offenders through the process of civil commitment and
treatment and strives to effectively reintegrate sexual offenders into a
fully healthy society but yet, at the same time, relegates the sexual
offender into the uncanny valley. H owever, the ethorobotic approach
arguably reconciles this paradox and claims to avoid the uncanny
valley.
R ecall that, in Figure 5, which depicts an ethorobotic extension of
Mori’s uncanny valley hypothesis, Miklósi et al. describe three peaks
that represent various levels of “familiarity” (on Mori’s scale) as the
development of robot human likeness progresses over time, from left
to right. The middle and highest peak represents the fully healthy
human. The peak to the left represents the familiarity level of robots
that have not yet reached full human likeness, with the industrial
robot at the far left, progressing in development to the humanoid
robot, nearing the peak of the first hill, before descending into the
first uncanny valley, where zombies and corpses are plotted. The hill
to the right represents “trans-humans,” which surpass fully healthy
humans on the scale of human capacity and then gradually become
less human-like with further development. Likewise, an ethorobotic
extension of Mori’s uncanny valley hypothesis, considered in the context of the verisimilitude of sexual offenders, appears as in Figure 20.

270. The verisimilitude of sexual offenders is discussed more fully in the forthcoming second article of this series.
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F IG U R E 20
Ethorobotic Extension of Mori’s U ncanny Valley
Hypothesis, Considered in the Context of the
Verisimilitude of Sexual Offenders

U nder the ethorobotic approach in Figure 20, the pre-release offenders (to the left of the first uncanny valley) plot just as they do
under Mori’s approach, with the perpetrator (Whiting) to the far left
and at the lowest level of “familiarity” in the public’s view, and then
progressively ascending positively in the public’s perception as the offender participates in, and completes, treatment, thereby progressing
in healthy human likeness while removed from the environment of the
healthy human. Beyond the first peak, however, those offenders who
qualify for release and reintegration begin to descend into the first
uncanny valley. The middle peak, of course, represents the height of
true healthy human likeness (Mori). The hill to the right of the middle
peak represents the offenders who are released and reintegrated into
society. Moving away from the middle peak, the verisimilitude of sexual offenders progresses away from the appearance of healthy human
likeness over time (the horizontal axis). A ccordingly, unconditionally
released offenders, like Fugelseth and Terhaar, present as most
“healthy human-like” by their absence of restrictions and, thus, plot
closest to the middle hill, which represents fully healthy humans. Because these offenders are the most indistinguishable from healthy
humans, they are received as the most uncanny and, therefore, plot
lowest on the post-release scale. A s offenders like O pheim, who appear to function effectively under conditional release, become less
“healthy human-like” (i.e., present decreased verisimilitude), they
plot slightly higher on the scale of public perception because they are
more easily identified and categorized as sexual offenders based on
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their identifying restrictions. O ffenders like H ubbart, who are released but fail to effectively reintegrate, however, plot lower on the
public perception scale because of their failure to reintegrate, but
these offenders do not plot as low as unconditionally released offenders because, upon their failure, they are recommitted and, consequently, are once again removed from society.
A s described in the discussion of human–robot relations, when assessing the effectiveness of the agent’s reintegration into the human
environment, the arguable success of the ethorobotic approach in
avoiding the uncanny valley lies in its conception of each agent’s functionality within a specific niche of the environment, as opposed to the
conception of human likeness as a measure of integrability. R ecall, in
Figure 6, that the ethorobotic approach allows robot designers to design robots to function within a particular niche of the human environment without designers concerning themselves with how the robots
appear in terms of human likeness. Thus, service robots can be optimized to fulfill specific service needs without having to appear humanlike, and combat robots can be designed optimally for combat without
having to appear like soldiers, and so on. If the optimization of a
robot’s function requires such human likeness that it approaches the
uncanny valley—such as in the case of Sweetie or the child sex
robot—the designer may simply remove the robot from the environment and redesign the robot for another function, thereby “jumping”
the robot to another niche and avoiding the uncanny valley altogether.
A s applied to the integration of sexual offenders within a healthy
human environment based on progress, over time, through the civil
commitment and treatment process, and gauging the ease with which
the respective agents would integrate into the environment based on
functionality within its specific niche, an “ethorobotic” approach
would appear as in Figure 21.
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F IG U R E 21
3D Ethorobotic Extension of Mori’s U ncanny Valley Hypothesis in
the Context of Sexual Offenders271

In Figure 21, we see the progression from perpetrator (far left) to
variations of released offenders (far right) over time, based on treatment progress that presents the respective categories of sexual offender as progressively “healthy human-like.” The level of “ease of
interaction” for each niche of offender across the terrain is based on
the capacity of the offender to optimize its functionality within its
niche. Ideally, this “etho-offender” approach allows policy-makers to
circumvent the uncanny valley of public perception that Mori’s approach appears to be unable to avoid. H owever, the litigation in states
like Minnesota and Missouri has proven that the treatment and release of sexually violent predators is never ideal.
Mori’s hypothesis of the uncanny valley originated within the field
of robotics design. Most of the research involving the application of
this phenomenon since then has been directed at other, related aspects of robotics, such as technological development, human–robot interactions, and artificial intelligence. Conceptually, researchers and
commentators in other fields have applied the uncanny valley princi271. This diagram is entirely derived from the concept and diagram presented in
Miklósi et al., supra note 187, at 5 fig.3. H owever, it has been altered to accommodate
the sexual offender context of this A rticle.
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ple to other contexts not involving robots,272 but these other contexts
are scarce. Nevertheless, in this A rticle, I propose that Mori’s uncanny
valley hypothesis supports the current social and legal perception of
sexual offenders, and explains the current predicament of so many
civilly committed sexually violent predators who have been denied release from civil commitment in so many states, like Minnesota and
Missouri. Mori’s uncanny valley hypothesis may also explain the
U nited States Supreme Court’s unwillingness to address what arguably is an unconstitutional application of substantive and procedural
due process by some civil commitment states. A n ethological approach to the application of Mori’s theory may offer a possible solution for avoiding—or at least bridging—the uncanny valley in the
context of sexual offenders. H owever, such an application is premised
on a critical assumption that must be made—an assumption that is
equally paradoxical in human nature and that presents some additional rather “uncanny” social, philosophical, and legal issues.
Specifically, Mori’s hypothesis of the uncanny valley applies strictly
to the character or “ethos” of nonhuman robots. Subsequent studies
that either assessed or applied the uncanny valley principle involved
some degree of inanimate or nonhuman object designed with some
aspect of human likeness—either physical characteristics or behavioral traits, or some combination of both. E ven the ethological approach extending Mori’s theory tested the hypothesis as applied to
nonhuman agents—dogs and technologically developed robots of varying degrees of functionality. U nder the ethological approach, the
test was whether these nonhuman species were able to integrate and
function effectively in the environment of the human species. H owever, in the context of sexually violent predators, we are dealing with
the reintegration of one species within the environment of its own species, from which the subject agents already have been banished. In this
context, although, psychologically, the insights of Jentsche, Freud,
Schelling, Lacan, and others may account for the uncanniness that one
may experience when confronting the nature of sexual offenders,
Mori’s consideration of the human likeness of inanimate objects and
the uncanny valley effect of that experience, on its face, seems inapplicable to agents of the same species bound by evolutionary consistency.
R ather, the more modern abjective principles of Kristeva and Tyler,
for example, appear more appropriate in assessing the marginalization
of sexual offenders as a sociological inquiry, rather than as an ethological analogy to the integration of animals and nonhuman robots into
human society. H owever, the uncanny valley theory is applicable to
the predicament of civilly committed sexual offenders since, after all,
sexual offenders are not human—at least in the public’s perception.273
A nd therein lies the problem.
272. See supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text.
273. See Levine & Meiners, supra note 17.
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It is this question—A re sexual offenders human?—wherein lies the
uncanny paradox of the verisimilitude of sexual offenders such that
Mori’s theory may explain the predicament of sexual offenders in the
civil commitment process.274 It is the public’s misguided perception of
all sexual offenders—even those who have served their criminal sentence, been civilly committed, and successfully completed treatment—
as dangerous and unfit to live in society that leaves sexual offenders
lingering unconstitutionally in civil commitment.
This is not to assert that any sexual offender is sub-human. O f
course, sexual offenders are human—created as members of the
human species. A nd although the acts of sexual offenders may violate
normative expectations for human behavior, their acts do not subjugate their human nature to that of a nonhuman species. Thus, evolutionary consistency remains a possible limitation on the application—
or existence—of Mori’s uncanny valley hypothesis in the context of
sexual offenders. H owever, an ethological extension of Mori’s hypothesis obviates this limitation.
Mori’s hypothesis remains a viable theory to be studied because it is
society’s perception of sexual offenders as inhuman—what researchers
call the “dehumanization hypothesis”—that causes the uncanny valley
phenomenon for sexual offenders.275 There may be debate about
whether violent sexual predators who are likely to recidivate are entitled to “human rights,” 276 or whether, as a public policy matter, society should value essential liberty over temporary security, or viceversa, but these controversial debates are beyond the scope of this
A rticle. The only question here is whether humans who violate society’s expectations for normative social behavior by committing egregious sexual offenses can effectively reintegrate into a society of fully
healthy humans who view the offenders as inhum an. In this first of a
series of three articles, I hypothesize that the uncanny valley phenomenon exists within the context of this question, and I urge researchers
to study this question. Within the limited scope of this A rticle, however, I conclude that if we are to study this question, for sexual offenders to avoid the uncanny valley and to reintegrate into the community,
society must adopt an ethological perspective of sexual offenders.277

274. “A sking whether the sex offender is human only legitimizes the question and
reinforces the doubt it arises from: if you have to ask, maybe the answer is no.” Id.
275. See Wang et al., supra note 15, at 401–04.
276. See A strid Birgden & Tony Ward, Sexual O ffenders and H um an R ights: Protecting V ictim s, in T H E O XFO R D H A ND BO O K O F SE X O FFE NCE S A ND SE X O FFE ND E R S
59 (Teela Sanders ed., 2017) (arguing that the rights of sexual offenders should be
viewed as equal, not subordinate, to the rights of victims).
277. I expand upon this conclusion in two forthcoming articles. See supra notes
15–16 and accompanying text.
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C O NCLU SIO N

Mori’s hypothesis of the uncanny valley simply raised a question
about the ability of nonhuman robots to integrate effectively into
human society—not based on having committed sexual offenses, of
course, but, rather, based on society’s perception of robots as indistinguishably human-like. A lthough research evidences that there may be
a host of other causative variables at work, the public’s misperception
of sexual offenders as “inhuman” has, to some degree, effectively relegated civilly committed sexual offenders to the uncanny valley,
thereby preventing them from effectively reintegrating into human society. A ccepting this premise, the question then becomes whether—or
how—sexually violent predators can avoid the uncanny valley and
more effectively reintegrate into a society of healthy humans that perceives them as incommensurably inhum an.
A s I will show in a forthcoming article in this series, the answer lies
in the verisimilitude of sexual offenders and the public’s willingness to
accept that its perception of all sexual offenders as inhuman monsters—or even as intolerably high risks of recidivism—is often inconsistent with reality. If the public can accept that its uncanny
perception of sexual offenders is not real, it is possible for not all, but
many, qualified sexual offenders to bridge the uncanny valley and
more effectively reintegrate and function within society.
To do so, however, society—and “the law”—must adopt an ethological perspective of sexual offenders. With this perspective, society may
receive reintegrated sexual offenders not as falsely-perceived inhuman
monsters that officials merely present as fully healthy human beings
but as real human beings who committed sexual offences but who
have been successfully treated and determined to pose minimal risk to
society. With this perspective, society may accept that, upon release,
the purpose of sexual offenders within the social niche is not to function as an offender who merely presents as indistinguishable from
fully healthy humans but, rather, to function optimally and safely
within society as reintegrated sexual offenders, subject to constitutionally imposed, post-release management policies that effectively prescribe the legal and social parameters of the ethological niche within
which sexual offenders must function.
A ccepting this conclusion, I will explain in the second article of this
series how such an approach applies to the verisimilitude of sexual
offenders and reconciles the uncanny distinction between the perception and reality of sexual offenders. In the third article of this series, I
will demonstrate how—or whether—such an approach may be implemented so as to bridge the uncanny valley constitutionally.

